Crime Stormy Daniels arrested *UPDATE* charges dropped within 24 hours

[Darkballs]

Not sure why you're appealing to alanb. By all means, he's welcome to his opinion if he wants to weigh in.

Do you mind telling me what page that holding you quoted is on. I read the 40ish page case you cited, and didn't see that holding anywhere.

Anyway, we can just have a difference of opinion on the law. It will be ok.

 

[JamesRussler]

Not sure why you're appealing to alanb. By all means, he's welcome to his opinion if he wants to weigh in.

Do you mind telling me what page that holding you quoted is on. I read the 40ish page case you cited, and didn't see that holding anywhere.

Anyway, we can just have a difference of opinion on the law. It will be ok.

I told you - Alan’s an attorney. Some other posters may be, but he’s the only one I know for a fact practices law. Since I’m apparently the only one who has noticed this seemingly obvious flaw in the City Attorney’s reasoning, I’d like to know what he thinks. I’m open to the possibility that I’m wrong, but having read the entire statute, I doubt it.

I don’t know which page it’s on off the top of my head. Just search for “regularly” and it will come up. The Court discusses the “no touch” provisions of the statute, including block quotes of subsections (C)(1) and (C)(2). Although the Court gives the boilerplate interpretation of the statute, the Court’s holding IIRC concerned a facial challenge to the statute. There’s no mention of a “non-regular appearance” exception anywhere (you obviously didn’t read it BTW if you missed the aforementioned discussion).

Yeah we can have a difference of opinion, but I’ll still be right, and you’ll still be wrong. Peace.

 

[Darkballs]

Yeah we can have a difference of opinion, but I’ll still be right, and you’ll still be wrong. Peace.

By deferring to another attorney? Ok, I'm an attorney too, and clerked at the federal appellate level. My dick is bigger than yours, so I win the debate.

Thanks for playing.

 

[JonesBones]

and @Edgy Brah

Yes, she has sex for money, and Donald Trump stuck his penis in her vagina without protection. And yes polygraphs are not reliable lie detectors, but are you saying that you don't think Trump had sex with her at all and is telling the truth, or just that he didn't have unprotected sex with her? I have not heard anyone but Rudy G say that he (Trump not Rudy) didn't bang Stormy, and all of his bible thumping supporters are just assuming he is lying and are giving him a "mulligan" about Stormy, and Karen McDougle, and everything else he lies about regularly.

If they are not reliable, then why did you bring them up?

I will repeat, polygraphs are junk science. You mentioned polygraphs as some form of evidence. You then went back on your stupid claim. End of discussion.

 

[JamesRussler]

By deferring to another attorney? Ok, I'm an attorney too, and clerked at the federal appellate level. My dick is bigger than yours, so I win the debate.

Thanks for playing.

I’ll accept at face value your claim of being an attorney, but if you’re going to claim “big dick” credentials beyond your license, you better be prepared to drop your pants. Who’d you clerk for and when? C’mon big boy - dish. Otherwise, I’m just going to assume you’re lying about your credentials.

And I didn’t “defer” to anyone, just invited a trusted second opinion. Aren’t you in the habit of doing that? Pretty common practice among litigators to ask for colleagues’ opinions.

Anyway, you are evading my argument. Dispense with your ad homs and just address the points I made. I laid out IMO a pretty compelling case that the law wasn’t intended to create an exception for non-“regular” strippers. You responded by restating Mr. Klein’s argument in conclusory fashion. If you want to put this argument to rest, just pull the legislative history, or check notes of decision. I’m sure you’re used to that having “clerked at the federal appellate level.” Go, on. Show me what you’re made of. I’m expecting to be blown away.

 

[Cake4Breakfast]

If they are not reliable, then why did you bring them up?

I will repeat, polygraphs are junk science. You mentioned polygraphs as some form of evidence. You then went back on your stupid claim. End of discussion.

You are inferring that I was supporting the validity and reliability of the polygraph as evidence, when all I said was that she took a polygraph, which is factual.

As for my purpose in bringing it up, because it is factual and because it persuades some people.

And you ducked my questions about if you think Stormy is lying about having sex without a condom, or if you think Trump is lying about the sex in general. You called her a whore, which I agreed with as factual, but I didn't get what you were implying in terms of the truthfulness of her claims. You gonna duck that again?

 

[Darkballs]

I’ll accept at face value your claim of being an attorney, but if you’re going to claim “big dick” credentials beyond your license, you better be prepared to drop your pants. Who’d you clerk for and when? C’mon big boy - dish. Otherwise, I’m just going to assume you’re lying about your credentials.

And I didn’t “defer” to anyone, just invited a trusted second opinion. Aren’t you in the habit of doing that? Pretty common practice among litigators to ask for colleagues’ opinions.

Anyway, you are evading my argument. Dispense with your ad homs and just address the points I made. I laid out IMO a pretty compelling case that the law wasn’t intended to create an exception for non-“regular” strippers. You responded by restating Mr. Klein’s argument in conclusory fashion. If you want to put this argument to rest, just pull the legislative history, or check notes of decision. I’m sure you’re used to that having “clerked at the federal appellate level.” Go, on. Show me what you’re made of. I’m expecting to be blown away.

I'm not sure what more you want. I made my case pretty clear: the the separate provisions should be taken separately and that the word "regular" cannot be explained away by claiming legislative intent and pointing to the other provision. Your notion, that they are supposed to be taken together (despite each having a separate and distinct exemption: for patrons, that they can touch family members; and for performers, that they "appear regularly nude."), is purely speculative. The correct thing for a court to do, would be to kick it back to the legislature. And of course you go forward with baseless partisan speculation that the DA here is colluding with democrats to hurt trump by protecting daniels, which you support with nothing.

And I don't care what you think of my credentials, as I clearly don't care about yours or alanb's. I care about sound arguments, for which you lack.

And no boy, I'm not going to specify what judge I worked for at the 5th Circuit (but I'll give you that), because between naming that judge and previous posts I've made about law school and where I've lived, it would be pretty easy to deduce who I am through simple googling. And I don't trust half the fucking trolls in this subforum. And you wouldn't provide that information here either, so don't bother whining unless you're about to post all your personal data here for everyone to see. Christ, what a stupid request. Hell kid, I could just throw out a random judge anyway, and how the fuck would you know the difference?

 

[JamesRussler]

I'm not sure what more you want. I made my case pretty clear: the the separate provisions should be taken separately and that the word "regular" cannot be explained away by claiming legislative intent and pointing to the other provision.

§§ 2907.40(C)(1) and (C)(2) are in pari materia, parallel, and clearly place reciprocal prohibitions upon patrons and employees, respectively. Statues in pari materia are of course construed together. The phrase at issue here in subsection (C)(2) is “regularly appears nude or seminude,” which, when read correctly, clearly applies to Pastrami Daniels. Wouldn’t you agree that she “regularly appears nude or semi nude?” Nevertheless, you have chosen to hang on this word “regularly” and interpreted its scope to an absurd degree. As a result, you think (C)(2) applies only to a stripper who “regularly appears . . . [at that same exact strip club].”

Let me illustrate the absurd result you’re suggesting: if Pastrami Daniels decided to motorboat Joe Blow (who is not a cop conducting a sting operation, not Daniels’s illediate family member) then Mr. Blow would be GUILTY under subsection (C)(1), but Ms. Daniels would be NOT GUILTY under (C)(2). Why would the drafters have wanted that result? They obviously didn’t, as I explain below.

I’ll grant that perhaps subsection (C)(2) can be plausibly misread, if read in isolation, without reference to the entire statute or its history. There is arguably some legitimate ambiguity there (see, I do concede valid points - something you should look into). As I correctly observed a few pages back, it perhaps might invite a vagueness challenge.

But when there’s ambiguity, examining legislative intent is perfectly appropriate. In fact, that’s what I did. I reviewed the bill’s history, including committee notes, statement of purpose, and prior drafts. And, as I predicted, it indeed appears § 2907.40 was intended to prohibit ALL touching of, and touching by, nude / semi-nude performers (except for patrons who are immediate family members) during the performance. It says so quite clearly in the bill’s original 2007 statement of purpose. That’s how the bill’s opponents understood it, which is why they challenged it on overbreadth grounds (refer to that Sixth Circuit case I gave you). To date, nobody has even invoked this argument that it only applies to girls who strip at a particular club “regularly” because it was commonly understood that it applied to all strippers.

And that’s it. This debate is finished.

Your notion, that they are supposed to be taken together (despite each having a separate and distinct exemption: for patrons, that they can touch family members; and for performers, that they "appear regularly nude."), is purely speculative.

Might wanna brush up on your obscure Latin phrases, Mr. Fifth Circuit clerk. Look up the phrase “in pari materia.” In law, it refers to a canon of statutory construction for when we have two or more statutes upon the same subject, especially parallel provision like subsections (C)(1) and (C)(2).

But more importantly, you should read both subsections (C)(1) and (C)(2) again. This time you might see that they BOTH have an exemption for immediate family members. Pretty embarrassing that you missed that for a self-professed federal appellate clerk.

I’m sorry, but there’s just no way you clerked in the U.S. Court of Appeals.

The correct thing for a court to do, would be to kick it back to the legislature. And of course you go forward with baseless partisan speculation that the DA here is colluding with democrats to hurt trump by protecting daniels, which you support with nothing.

On the contrary, I supported my arguments with links to the statute, case law, and I even reviewed the legislative history and committee notes. I ended this debate rather conclusively. You? “Oh, umm, I just relied on the plain meaning of the statute, and, uh, I was a federal appellate clerk.” Face it - you didn’t vet your argument, and it turned out to be wrong.

And I don't care what you think of my credentials, as I clearly don't care about yours or alanb's. I care about sound arguments, for which you lack.

And no boy, I'm not going to specify what judge I worked for at the 5th Circuit (but I'll give you that), because between naming that judge and previous posts I've made about law school and where I've lived, it would be pretty easy to deduce who I am through simple googling. And I don't trust half the fucking trolls in this subforum. And you wouldn't provide that information here either, so don't bother whining unless you're about to post all your personal data here for everyone to see. Christ, what a stupid request. Hell kid, I could just throw out a random judge anyway, and how the fuck would you know the difference?

You are correct that if you were in fact a clerk on the Fifth Circuit, I could determine your identity in short order based on what you’ve written already. It’s a very exclusive club that you’re claiming to be in after all.

But you were never a clerk on the Fifth Circuit. I know plenty of federal clerks, and they are an extremely thoughtful and detail-oriented bunch to say the least. They keep me on my toes. But you have the research skills of a doc review attorney. Your analysis is shit. Your reading comprehension is shit. Your writing... ehhh, at least it’s better than your research. Quite simply, you weren’t a clerk. You’re not cut from that cloth. It’s not just that we disagree, because I have utmost respect for worthy intellectual adversaries. You sir are a fraud. You’ve been sussed.

Aside from that, don’t invoke credentials which you aren’t prepared to validate. I have my own impressive “big dick” credentials which I’ve kept mum about (maybe slipped out once or twice). But because I prefer to remain anonymous, I never bother invoking them to bolster my credibility. I have too much to lose by mixing my professional life up with Sherdog. So I understand your desire to remain anonymous. I get it. But you can’t have anonymity and status-based credibility too. It’s one or the other. It’s a trade off that all white collar shitposters must accept.

Good luck, Mr. “Fifth Circuit clerk”

 

[Darkballs]

On the contrary, I supported my arguments with links to the statute, case law, and I even reviewed the legislative history and committee notes.

You've brought up legislative intent, and suggested that a court should convict a person whom the provision exempts in it's plain language. There's no way you'll win that, despite insisting that it's some practice that happens constantly throughout the land. With criminal statutes like this, it doesn't, and the DA was right to realize that he would lose and dropped the charges.
You can color it with all the partisan language you want (pastrami daniel, boy that sure is a slam against her, but not against the guy who paid to fuck her), but it doesn't make your "lets just construe the statutes together for a criminal conviction because I heard of statutory interpretation from a professor," a sound argument.

Aside from that, don’t invoke credentials which you aren’t prepared to validate.

Really starting to think you got into law school on a waiver. I've been pretty emphatic that I don't care about credentials, only sound arguments. You started dropping alanb's credentials (even though he hasn't weighed in here) and got butthurt when it backfired. Now you're crying that I haven't posted my personal information here for you. Why don't you go ahead and post your name, address, and telephone number for all of us? You won't? Then shut the fuck up.

Jesus christ kid, we have a different interpretation of the statute. Let it fucking go. You don't need to reply with the same argument with some Y1 law school principles thrown in. Got it. Statutory interpretation from one provision to another. That's your argument. It blows. If you want to throw it out with some run on sentences again, go ahead.

 

[JamesRussler]

You've brought up legislative intent, and suggested that a court should convict a person whom the provision exempts in it's plain language. There's no way you'll win that, despite insisting that it's some practice that happens constantly throughout the land. With criminal statutes like this, it doesn't, and the DA was right to realize that he would lose and dropped the charges.

You can color it with all the partisan language you want (pastrami daniel, boy that sure is a slam against her, but not against the guy who paid to fuck her), but it doesn't make your "lets just construe the statutes together for a criminal conviction because I heard of statutory interpretation from a professor," a sound argument.

I never said the court needs to order Pastrami Daniels prosecuted/convicted. On the contrary, the court is probably powerless to reverse such an exercise of prosecutorial discretion, whether that discretion was abused or not. But since Mr. Klein is an elected official, perhaps his Columbus constituents ought to know that he's soft on crime. After all, Ms. Daniels "is guilty of illegal sexually oriented activity in a sexually oriented business," which appears to make her a sex offender of sorts under the Ohio Revised Code. See O.R.C. § 2907 et seq. And since there will probably be a flood of strippers invoking this new "non-regular stripper defense," Ohio's state Attorney General will probably have to weigh in at some point.

You haven't responded to any of the substantive points I raised with regards to construction of § 2907.40(C). Anyone who is following our discussion can see that.

Really starting to think you got into law school on a waiver. I've been pretty emphatic that I don't care about credentials, only sound arguments. You started dropping alanb's credentials (even though he hasn't weighed in here) and got butthurt when it backfired. Now you're crying that I haven't posted my personal information here for you. Why don't you go ahead and post your name, address, and telephone number for all of us? You won't? Then shut the fuck up.

Don't turn this around on me, bub. I'm not the one who claimed to clerk for a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit – you did. It's your burden to verify those credentials. For reasons previously stated, I believe you're lying about your federal clerkship. You're basically claiming to have a 10-inch penis, but refusing to drop your pants. Shyeah, okay bruh. We believe you .

As for @alanb, he probably has his reasons for not weighing in, and I can respect that. I don't expect him to jump into the middle of every gunfight. But from what I've seen, his research and analysis are far superior to yours. If he disagrees with me, I imagine he can probably do a better job persuading me than you did.

 

[Lord Coke]

I never said the court needs to order Pastrami Daniels prosecuted/convicted. On the contrary, the court is probably powerless to reverse such an exercise of prosecutorial discretion, whether that discretion was abused or not. But since Mr. Klein is an elected official, perhaps his Columbus constituents ought to know that he's soft on crime. After all, Ms. Daniels "is guilty of illegal sexually oriented activity in a sexually oriented business," which appears to make her a sex offender of sorts under the Ohio Revised Code. See O.R.C. § 2907 et seq. And since there will probably be a flood of strippers invoking this new "non-regular stripper defense," Ohio's state Attorney General will probably have to weigh in at some point.

You haven't responded to any of the substantive points I raised with regards to construction of § 2907.40(C). Anyone who is following our discussion can see that.



Don't turn this around on me, bub. I'm not the one who claimed to clerk for a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit – you did. It's your burden to verify those credentials. For reasons previously stated, I believe you're lying about your federal clerkship. You're basically claiming to have a 10-inch penis, but refusing to drop your pants. Shyeah, okay bruh. We believe you .

As for @alanb, he probably has his reasons for not weighing in, and I can respect that. I don't expect him to jump into the middle of every gunfight. But from what I've seen, his research and analysis are far superior to yours. If he disagrees with me, I imagine he can probably do a better job persuading me than you did.

I agree with your analysis and believe you are right here James. I just don't have time to write out a detailed response. I have a rule 16/settlement conference in Hawaii that I am flying out to tommorow. And I am running around doing errands because I go directly to NY for depos the following week and won't be able to mind the house for a couple weeks.

 

[Darkballs]

Don't turn this around on me, bub. I'm not the one who claimed to clerk for a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit – you did. It's your burden to verify those credentials. For reasons previously stated, I believe you're lying about your federal clerkship.

I'll probably lose a lot of sleep tonight, twisting and turning over what you believe.

 

[Darkballs]

I agree with your analysis and believe you are right here James. I just don't have time to write out a detailed response. I have a rule 16/settlement conference in Hawaii that I am flying out to tommorow. And I am running around doing errands because I go directly to NY for depos the following week and won't be able to mind the house for a couple weeks.

I don't believe your a lawyer, and thus discount your opinion entirely. Only if you post your name an address will I then take your opinion into account. Otherwise, I win the debate.

 

[JamesRussler]

I agree with your analysis and believe you are right here James. I just don't have time to write out a detailed response. I have a rule 16/settlement conference in Hawaii that I am flying out to tommorow. And I am running around doing errands because I go directly to NY for depos the following week and won't be able to mind the house for a couple weeks.

I figured. You're a busy man! Give 'em hell.

 

[JamesRussler]

I'll probably lose a lot of sleep tonight, twisting and turning over what you believe.

I don't believe your a lawyer, and thus discount your opinion entirely. Only if you post your name an address will I then take your opinion into account. Otherwise, I win the debate.

Original Legislation: http://archives.legislature.state.oh.us/BillText127/127_SB_16_EN_N.html

To amend section 503.52 and to enact sections 715.55 and 2907.40 of the Revised Code to restrict the hours of operation of sexually oriented businesses, to prohibit patrons and employees of a sexually oriented business who are not immediate family members from touching each other while on the premises of that business and while the employee is nude or seminude, and to require the state to indemnify a township or municipal corporation for liability incurred in enforcing a resolution or ordinance that regulates adult entertainment establishments, is adopted in conformance with the Attorney General's guidance, and is found by a court to be unconstitutional or otherwise legally defective.

Earlier Version (with legislative findings) http://archives.legislature.state.oh.us/bills.cfm?ID=127_SB_16_I

(A) It is the purpose of this chapter to promote the health, safety, and general welfare of the people of Ohio by establishing reasonable regulations to prevent the deleterious secondary effects of sexually oriented businesses. The regulations in this chapter have neither the purpose nor effect of imposing a limitation or restriction on the content or reasonable access to any communicative materials, including sexually oriented materials.

(B) The prohibitions in this chapter are based upon and justified by the adverse secondary effects of sexually oriented businesses identified in numerous judicial decisions and reports concerning such secondary effects including, but not limited to: City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425 (2002); City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986), Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976, California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972); Deja Vu of Cincinnati, L.L.C. v. Union Township Bd. of Trustees, 411 F.3d 777 (6th Cir. 2005) (en banc); DLS, Inc. v. City of Chattanooga, 107 F.3d 403 (6th Cir. 1997); 511 Detroit Street, Inc. v. Kelley, 807 F.2d 1293 (6th Cir. 1986); Broadway Books v. Roberts, 642 F. Supp. 486 (E.D. Tenn. 1986); Bright Lights, Inc. v. City of Newport, 830 F. Supp. 378 (E.D. Ky. 1993); Richland Bookmart, Inc. v. Nichols, 278 F.3d 570 (6th Cir. 2002); Richland Bookmart v. Nichols, 137 F.3d 435 (6th Cir. 1998); In re Tenn. Public Indecency Statute, Nos. 96-6512, 96-6573, 97-5924, 97-5938, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 535 (6th Cir. Jan. 13, 1999); Bamon Corp. v. City of Dayton, 923 F.2d 470 (6th Cir. 1991); City of Chattanooga v. Cinema 1, Inc., 150 S.W. 3d 390 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004); Deja Vu of Nashville, Inc., et al. v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County, 274 F.3d 377 (6th Cir. 2001); Kentucky Restaurant Concepts, Inc. v. City of Louisville & Jefferson County, 209 F. Supp. 2d 672 (W.D. Ky. 2002); Ctr. for Fair Public Policy v. Maricopa County, 336 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 2003); City of Cleveland v. Daher, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 5937 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000); State ex rel. Nasal v. BJS No. 2, Inc., 127 Ohio Misc. 2d 101 (Ct. Comm. Pleas 2003); Gammoh v. City of La Habra, 395 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2005); World Wide Video of Washington, Inc. v. City of Spokane, 368 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2004); Ben's Bar, Inc. v. Village of Somerset, 316 F.3d 702 (7th Cir. 2003); and Austin, Texas - 1986; Indianapolis, Indiana - 1984; Garden Grove, California - 1991; Houston, Texas - 1983, 1997; Phoenix, Arizona - 1979, 1995-98; Chattanooga, Tennessee - 1999-2003; Los Angeles, California - 1977; Spokane, Washington - 2001; St. Cloud, Minnesota - 1994; Dallas, Texas - 1997; Greensboro, North Carolina - 2003; New York, New York Times Square - 1994; Minneapolis, Minnesota (Holsopple Report)- 1998; Michigan Legislature (Sherman Testimony) - 2000; which support the following findings:

(1) Sexually oriented businesses, as a category of commercial uses, are associated with a wide variety of adverse secondary effects including, but not limited to lewdness, public indecency, prostitution, potential spread of disease, illicit drug use and drug trafficking, personal and property crimes, negative impacts on surrounding properties, blight, litter, and sexual assault and exploitation.

(2) Each of the foregoing negative secondary effects constitutes a harm which the state has a substantial government interest in preventing and/or abating. This substantial government interest in preventing secondary effects is independent of any comparative analysis between sexually oriented and non-sexually oriented businesses. The cases and documentation relied on in this chapter are reasonably believed to be relevant to said secondary effects.

(C) The provisions of this chapter shall be construed so as to further the purposes of this chapter as set forth in division (A) of this section.

(D) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to preempt or prevent counties, municipal corporations and townships from adopting or enforcing laws concerning sexually oriented businesses that are as restrictive or more restrictive than the provisions in this chapter.

All of this is discussed in that Sixth Circuit opinion I linked you to. You have no excuse for being this ignorant.

 

[Darkballs]

You have no excuse for being this ignorant.

I'm sorry, but I don't see your personal information here, so I'm just gonna disregard everything.

But in all seriousness, I don't see how this supports your argument, as the purposes set forth in division A are vague and cannot be used to discount the distinction between the two provisions.

 

[JamesRussler]

I'm sorry, but I don't see your personal information here, so I'm just gonna disregard everything.

But in all seriousness, I don't see how this supports your argument, as the purposes set forth in division A are vague and cannot be used to discount the distinction between the two provisions.

That's funny, because the Sixth Circuit relied upon the legislative findings set forth in the original SB 16 (see pp. 5-6), and it did not find them "vague," or otherwise problematic in any way.

I'll help you out with a counterargument. Although the Court noted that "[t]hese findings were included in the version of S.B. 16 initially passed by the Ohio General Assembly," it also noted that "the above legislative findings do not appear in the version of Substitute S.B. 16 enacted into law." If the legislature omitted its findings from the final version of the statute, shouldn't that evince its intent that the findings not guide implementation of the law? After all, that language was removed from the final version of the bill...

The answer to that is that legislative findings / conclusions aren't typically included in final legislation, and instead should only be used for resolving ambiguity. After all, the legislature exists to make law, not to make facts. Even if the findings were included in the final legislation, they would be used the same way – to resolve ambiguity when the meaning of the law isn't clear. Anyway, the final version of the bill includes its own statement of purpose which directly addresses the conduct at issue. It's right there at the top: "... to prohibit patrons and employees of a sexually oriented business who are not immediate family members from touching each other while on the premises of that business and while the employee is nude or seminude." Nowhere in any legislative materials is there any reference to an exception for non-"regular" strippers. As I have stated many times, that's because the statute applies to "employees who regularly appear nude or seminude." To the extent there's any ambiguity, it must be resolved in favor of accomplishing the statute's purpose.

 

[Eazy123]

Hard to believe Stormy is my age. All those dicks to the head took their toll.

Would still smash though

 

[Darkballs]

Nowhere in any legislative materials is there any reference to an exception for non-"regular" strippers.

And there in lies the rub. Because that language IS in the statute. And that should matter more to the court than the legislative materials, which only refer broadly to concerns such as STD's, immorality, etc; but give no clarification as to why "regular" was used. As it can be argued both ways, the proper response would be to kick it back to the legislature. This is what the DA has done. If this matters so much to the legislature, we'll see them enact swift changes to fight the scourge of stripers, gasp, touching people while nude.

So we can wait and see, or you can keep making the same argument, over and fucking over again. Seriously, I get your argument, I understand completely what you are saying, and yet I still disagree.

 

[JamesRussler]

And there in lies the rub. Because that language IS in the statute. And that should matter more to the court than the legislative materials, which only refer broadly to concerns such as STD's, immorality, etc; but give no clarification as to why "regular" was used. As it can be argued both ways, the proper response would be to kick it back to the legislature. This is what the DA has done. If this matters so much to the legislature, we'll see them enact swift changes to fight the scourge of stripers, gasp, touching people while nude.

Yeah. Turns out this statute already survived a vagueness challenge in the district court. They didn’t even bother appealling it.

Answer me this: why do YOU think the legislature would have wanted to create an exception for non-“regular” strippers? Why would they want to charge Buckeye Betty, but not Pastrami Daniels, for the same exact conduct? Seriously, answer that one for me.

So we can wait and see, or you can keep making the same argument, over and fucking over again. Seriously, I get your argument, I understand completely what you are saying, and yet I still disagree.

I’m not doing it for you, silly. I’m doing it for the silently lurking majority.