Interesting scenario where such comments would fall under the freedom of speech, but not free of consequences category. Typically the first consequence is losing your job for saying something profoundly stupid as she did.
The government here though is in fact her employer, so does that mean it is still freedom of speech so long as she isn't simply prosecuted for a crime? Or can there be no consequences whatsoever (such as a firing) because the public employer's hands are completely tied due to being a branch of government as opposed to a private company. Any Sherbro lawyers know if there's been a case precedent of this?
@alanb ?
My thoughts are she's royally a cunt, but I guess so long as she doesn't spew this level of crap in her classroom (doubtful) I'd prefer there be no action other than the University condemning the words and making it very clear she does not in the slightest represent the school's views
I have never dealt with employment speech in actual practice THis is the test the courts use. I think it is a close call
http://www.landmark-publications.com/2015/03/garcetti-pickering-balancing-test.html
The Supreme Court has unequivocally rejected the notion that public employees forfeit their right to freedom of speech by virtue of their public employment.
Pickering v. Bd. of Ed., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). However, the Court has also recognized that the State has an interest in regulating the speech of its employees.
Id. When presented with these competing interests, courts are directed to "arrive at a balance between the interests of the [public employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees."
Id.Graziosi v. City of Greenville Mississippi, (5th Cir. 2015).
To determine whether the public employee's speech is entitled to protection, courts must engage in a two-step inquiry.
See Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2378 (2014). The first step requires determining whether the employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern.
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006). If the employee has spoken as a citizen on a matter of public concern, then a First Amendment claim may arise.
Id. The second step of the inquiry requires determining "whether the relevant government entity had an adequate justification for treating the employee differently from any other member of the general public."
Id.;
see also Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2380.
Graziosi v. City of Greenville Mississippi, ibid.
For an employee's speech to be entitled to First Amendment protection, she must be speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern.
See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418;
see also Hurst v. Lee Cnty., Miss., ___ F.3d ___, No. 13-60540, 2014 WL 4109647, at *2 (5th Cir. Aug. 21, 2014). Whether a statement is made as an employee or as a citizen is a question of law.
Davis v. McKinney, 518 F.3d 304, 315 (5th Cir. 2008). Furthermore, whether a statement addresses a matter of public concern is a question of law that must be resolved by the court.
Salge, 411 F.3d at 184.
Graziosi v. City of Greenville Mississippi, ibid.
Until the Supreme Court's 2006 decision in
Garcetti, public employees' First Amendment claims were governed by the public concern analysis and balancing test set out in
Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968), and
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983).
Garcetti, however, changed the law. . . . The Court held in
Garcetti that "when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline."
Id. at 421, 126 S.Ct. 1951.
Demers v. Austin, 746 F. 3d 402 (9th Cir. 2014).
The []
Garcetti/Pickering analysis governs First Amendment retaliation claims.
See Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Acad., 492 F.3d 1192, 1202 (10th Cir.2007). This test comprises five elements:
(1) whether the speech was made pursuant to an employee's official duties; (2) whether the speech was on a matter of public concern; (3) whether the government's interests, as employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public service are sufficient to outweigh the plaintiff's free speech interests; (4) whether the protected speech was a motivating factor in the adverse employment action; and (5) whether the defendant would have reached the same employment decision in the absence of the protected conduct.
Dixon v. Kirkpatrick, 553 F.3d 1294, 1302 (10th Cir.2009). The first three elements are issues of law for the court to decide, while the last two are factual issues typically decided by the jury.
Id. But see Cypert v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-050 of Osage Cnty., 661 F.3d 477, 483-84 (10th Cir.2011) (affirming summary judgment for defendants where plaintiff could not meet evidentiary burden at the fourth step).
Trant v. Oklahoma, 754 F. 3d 1158 (10th Cir. 2014).
Garcetti does not apply to "speech related to scholarship or teaching."
Id. at 425, 126 S.Ct. 1951.
Demers v. Austin, ibid.
[A]cademic employee speech not covered by
Garcetti is protected under the First Amendment, using the analysis established in
Pickering. The
Pickering test has two parts. First, the employee must show that his or her speech addressed "matters of public concern."
Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568, 88 S.Ct. 1731;
see Connick, 461 U.S. at 146, 103 S.Ct. 1684. Second, the employee's interest "in commenting upon matters of public concern" must outweigh "the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees."
Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568, 88 S.Ct. 1731;
see Cockrel v. Shelby Cnty. Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1036, 1048 (6th Cir.2001);
Leary v. Daeschner, 228 F.3d 729, 737 (6th Cir. 2000).
Demers v. Austin, ibid.
THIS CASEBOOK contains a selection of 54 U. S. Court of Appeals decisions that interpret, analyze and apply the Garcetti-Pickering balancing test. The selection of decisions spans from 2010 to the date of publication.