Why is Academic Writing So *Needlessly *Ridiculous?

You're officially my favorite person on sherdog.
I think your rhetoric this post clarifies things for me. You're less dismissive than I had originally considered. Sorry if I misread early on.
Funny enough, my supervisor did her PhD with Mulhall, a OLP and postmodern philosophy scholar. And my wife's PhD program did a lot with Cavell.

I probably don't care about OLP because I'm not super interested in philosophy of language. And I've hung out with too many people who beat you over the head with OLP, lol. I have read some Cavell, and I've read his stuff on film. Can't say I enjoyed it but I found it interesting.

My philosophy guys are Heidegger, Husserl, Gadamar, and Marion, which means I'm fairly well read with German idealism as a whole, especially Kant and Schelling.
My theological stuff is rooted in Aquinas, Plotinus, Przywara, Balthasar, and a few contemporary people.

As it were, Malick is a bit of a hero of mine. We still use his translation of Heidegger's Essence of Reason.

But as you can imagine, because people like Heidegger and Husserl get the treatment of "unnecessarily dense," so I'm always concrrned with the charge. I

I have an exam on Gadamer tomorrow. My prof hung out with him a couple of times back in the days. His Truth and Method is so dense ! It takes me 1h to get through 15 pages, but the amount of knowledge he brings is worth every second.
 
If I wcwe fq
I have an exam on Gadamer tomorrow. My prof hung out with him a couple of times back in the days. His Truth and Method is so dense ! It takes me 1h to get through 15 pages, but the amount of knowledge he brings is worth every second.
That's awesome!
My wife is a big Gadamar person, but I've read 4-5 of his works, and I've read truth and method a number of times. It's not easy, no doubt.

Have any of you read Erazim Kohak?
 
This is my position on poststructuralism: That it's philosophically invalid but hermeneutically valid.

Because of that "self-undermining nonsense language," though, it would be more accurate to say that postmodernists can't refute interpretations of postmodernism as premodernism or modernism. To refute someone's characterization of something presupposes knowledge on the part of the refuter as to what that something is...but to talk of what things are is to talk using "metaphysical" language, and Derrida destroyed "Western metaphysics," so true/false, right/wrong, good/bad, that shit doesn't fly anymore. We've "deconstructed" such "metaphysical" notions and we've decided that they're undecidable.

It's such a fucking con job. But boy oh boy is it something to behold if you get a postmodernist/poststructuralist to go on and on about how true/false, right/wrong, good/bad, etc. are "undecidable" and then say something to them that makes their skin crawl (like "Barthes is bad" or "Marx was wrong") and that they immediately lash out at you for saying because it's so obviously - so decidably - false/wrong/bad.

If I felt that someone I was talking to was genuinely ignorant but also genuinely curious, then I'd take the time to explain why that bullshit is bullshit, but in my dealings with "true believers," I'd sometimes treat them the way that Peter treated his company suck-up and just twist them up in contradictions until their heads exploded :D
Flawlessly articulated
 
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That's awesome!
My wife is a big Gadamar person, but I've read 4-5 of his works, and I've read truth and method a number of times. It's not easy, no doubt.

Have any of you read Erazim Kohak?

No, I have no idea who that is. I would be interested in learning more about him.
I'm mostly a student of Ancient Philosophy, I've learnt Greek, I'm working on Latin and Arabic. That's where my interest in Gadamer came from, he has interesting takes on Ancient Philosophy. I'm also very interested in Philosiphy of History (not the trying to build a a priori teleology of history, but the what is historical knowledge, is it a science or an art part).
 
No, I have no idea who that is. I would be interested in learning more about him.
I'm mostly a student of Ancient Philosophy, I've learnt Greek, I'm working on Latin and Arabic. That's where my interest in Gadamer came from, he has interesting takes on Ancient Philosophy. I'm also very interested in Philosiphy of History (not the trying to build a a priori teleology of history, but the what is historical knowledge, is it a science or an art part).

Philosophy of history is interesting, it intersects with a lot of postmodernist stuff. I had to engage with that for my MA dissertation; the nature of historical representations of the past and the way in which historical accounts are constructed.

Have you read much Hayden White?
 
Philosophy of history is interesting, it intersects with a lot of postmodernist stuff. I had to engage with that for my MA dissertation; the nature of historical representations of the past and the way in which historical accounts are constructed.

Have you read much Hayden White?

I haven't. I live in the French world so my references might be different from yours. I also study in Philosophy and Classical Studies, so I read Historians talking about the process of making historical knowledge. I've mostly studied Henri-Iréné Marrou and his "de la connaissance historique" (on historical knowledge). A good part is anti-marxism because they were influential in his time in France. I also liked Paul Vayne's "comment écrit-on l'histoire ?" (How do we write history ?). He is very much influenced by Foucault. His main purpose is showing that history is radically different from science.

I guess postmoderns would be great for digging deeper in the subject. Despite tthir bad reputation (which I think is due to lazy readings), they are very well-read and I've always had an inclination towards Foucault. I like that they intersect philosophy with other branch of knowledge, because I think "pure" philosophy is a thing of the past. What was your MA about ?
 
There definitely seems to be an "academic" dialect. By my second year in college, I noticed it was given that each professor, regardless of subject, would advise the class, "It would behoove you to take copious notes," find some way to work the plural "syllabi" vs the singular "syllabus," and always made sure to let us know that they were being "facetious" every time that they were being ironic.
 
I would say they are expressing complex ideas. Those ideas need a complex explanation. Sure, I have seen some academic writing that was a little too much. But most of what I have read has been only as complex as is necessary to convey the idea they are presenting. All of the other stuff I thought was overly complex wasn’t really that complex. It was just that the author was using discipline specific jargon which, if you study that particular discipline, actually simplifies the writing for those readers that do. That’s the whole purpose of jargon.
 
Have you read much Hayden White?

I've already posted this in conversation with you, but I've got to keep spamming the good stuff ;)

It's outside the scope of history (it's in the context of the philosophy of art), but in his book Beyond Aesthetics, Noël Carroll has a brilliant critique of Hayden White in an essay titled "Interpretation, History, and Narrative." It might be interesting for/relevant to you. It was originally published in The Monist in 1990 if that helps you to track it down.

On another note, I'm currently reading a novel called John Woman and you'd probably get a kick out of it: The main character is a history professor and he's pretty much Hayden White :D

I guess postmoderns would be great for digging deeper in the subject. Despite tthir bad reputation (which I think is due to lazy readings), they are very well-read and I've always had an inclination towards Foucault.

More spam and still more spam. I'd apologize for the relentless spamming, but I just can't abide nonsense. That postmodernists aren't viewed as the humanities equivalent of flat earthers in science is a major failing of the humanities, but make no mistake: Their bad reputation has been earned and then some.

Also, on Foucault in particular, you know that that dude was a creepy pedo wackadoodle, right?

I have noticed he quotes Foucault in one of his gibberish filled papers. That is hardly surprising. Foucault is incredibly influential with postmodern scumbags
I think Foucalt himself admitted that most of his intellectual "quests" were motivated by the desire to get closer to young boys.

Atleast he was more brutally honest than many of his followers.

Quick story. So I've been doing the PhD thing in my department for three years now. On two separate occasions, in two completely different seminars, I've brought up the same example to challenge people (mainly my professor, who I like and respect and get along with very well but who is regrettably a hardcore poststructuralist and who loves Barthes, Derrida, and Foucault) and have been met with silence both times. The first seminar was devoted to Volume 1 of Foucault's The History of Sexuality and the second one was just a general seminar. In both instances, I was trying to demonstrate the dangerous consequences of doing away with the concept of objectivity in favor of ideas of "social constructs" and all that.

The example that I brought up was Foucault's position on pedophilia. He addresses pedophilia in The History of Sexuality and gives it the standard twist with the poor and oppressed pedophile who just wants to be free to express his honest-to-goodness sexuality. I couldn't make this shit up if I tried. It's pages 31-32:

"One day in 1867, a farm hand from the village of Lapcourt, who was somewhat simple-minded, employed here then there depending on the season, living hand-to-mouth from a little charity or in exchange for the worst sort of labor, sleeping in barns and stables, was turned in to the authorities. At the border of a field, he had obtained a few caresses from a little girl, just as he had done before and seen done by the village urchins round about him; for, at the edge of the wood, or in the ditch by the road leading to Saint-Nicolas, they would play the familiar game called 'curdled milk.' So he was pointed out by the girl's parents to the mayor of the village, reported by the mayor to the gendarmes, led by the gendarmes to the judge, who indicted him and turned him over first to a doctor, then to two other experts who not only wrote their report but also had it published. What is the significant thing about this story? The pettiness of it all; the fact that this everyday occurrence in the life of village sexuality, these inconsequential bucolic pleasures, could become, from a certain time, the object not only of a collective intolerance but of a judicial action, a medical intervention, a careful clinical examination, and an entire theoretical elaboration [...] This was undoubtedly one of the conditions enabling the institutions of knowledge and power to overlay this everyday bit of theater with their solemn discourse. So it was that our society - and it was doubtless the first in history to take such measures - assembled around these timeless gestures, these barely furtive pleasures between simple-minded adults and alert children, a whole machinery for speechifying, analyzing, and investigating."

This story never ceases to turn my stomach. You can see the equivocation, going from ignorant children playing a "game" to "alert children" who know exactly what's going on. But, putting that shit aside and focusing on the philosophical issue: If there is no such thing as objectivity, then you can't say that pedophilia is objectively wrong and that people shouldn't be free to engage in sex with children.

First off, pedophilia is just a social construct, and the concepts of "right" and "wrong" don't apply to mere constructs. But even if I were to be granted use of the concepts of right and wrong, if objectivity is out the window, then my thinking pedophilia is wrong is just an arbitrary, subjective opinion no better or worse than Foucault's arbitrary, subjective opinion that it's right. Who am I to say, and on what grounds can I possibly prove, that any sexual desire - or, really, who am I to say, and on what grounds can I possibly prove, that anything - is wrong? Since it's all just a power game, my position that pedophilia is wrong is really just my desire to arbitrarily oppress the righteous pedophiles (ignore the fact that, in the absence of concepts of right and wrong, Foucault still thinks he's right), and if I were a halfway decent person, then I'd make the "institution of knowledge and power" that is "solemnly" trying to stop, just for the sake of "pettiness," the "inconsequential bucolic pleasures" of kids jerking off hobos stop oppressing those poor upstanding citizens and let them be free.

:eek: :confused: :rolleyes: o_O

My professor has two small children, so I'd like to think that he finds Foucault's pedophilia shit suitably horrifying - though I wouldn't be surprised if he wasn't even aware that Foucault, along with a number of other members of the French intellectual "elite" of the era like Sartre and Althusser, signed a petition in 1977 to get rid of consent and statutory rape laws - but nobody knows how to respond to simple shit like this. It's easy to talk the postmodernist/poststructuralist talk, but when confronted with the kind of world they'd actually be living in/are helping to bring into existence, there's always silence as the gears of denial start to go into overdrive the second it comes time for them to walk the walk.

When people like Peterson talk about how this shit isn't just "academic" in the sense of being trivial and having no bearing outside of pretentious classrooms, this is what he's talking about. Ideas can have practical effects and consequences that FAR exceed what the ideologically possessed have ever fathomed/are capable of fathoming, and it's so often the case that, if anybody was even half paying attention to what their ideological leaders were saying - and, even more importantly, why they were saying it - then they'd run for the fucking hills.

I think "pure" philosophy is a thing of the past.

Out of curiosity, what do you have in mind when invoking the notion of "'pure' philosophy"? Because it seems like a straw man. If what it's meant to convey is something on the "theory" side of the "theory/practice" dichotomy - a false dichotomy, but we'll leave that to the side for the moment - then I'd still be curious to know which philosophers and/or which philosophical schools you think qualify, because, even on the basis of this conception of philosophical "purity," Confucius, Aristotle, Descartes...it doesn't appear that any of them would qualify.

(Incidentally, this is yet another one of the many ironies of postmodernism: Despite ostensibly being against "grand narratives," they're the best at concocting the grandest narratives ever conceived, from Lyotard's shtick on science to Derrida's shtick on Western metaphysics, for the purpose of showing how super enlightened and transgressive they are :rolleyes:)
 
I've already posted this in conversation with you, but I've got to keep spamming the good stuff ;)

Ah yes I had completely forgot about this, I will have to track it down. I do like White though as I said before, of course he's not spot on either (and as with a lot of these postmodernists seems to push the argument to breaking point, which I suppose is a feature of the postmodern project in general) but his account of historical Narratives as 'verbal fictions' which are constructed in much the same way as literature definitely has some useful insights. It was useful at the time for questioning the traditional view of history (as propounded by Leopold Van Ranke in the 19th century) as a science, revealing the past 'as it really was'. Pointing to the ways in which historical narratives were, on some level, constructions with their own degree of interpretation was useful. If nothing else, it also forced other theorists to come to the defense of history. I don't think I returned the favour, but I will now, some good critiques of White I have used in the past are:

Andrew P. Norman, ‘Telling It Like It Was: Historical Narratives on Their Own Terms’, History and Theory, vol. 30, no. 2 (May, 1991).

Chris Lorenz, ‘Can Histories Be True? Narrativism, Positivism, and the “Metaphorical Turn”’, History and Theory, vol. 37, no. 3, (Oct., 1998).

But I find White's theories particularly useful for the period I am looking at, because history writing then was less developed and extremely partisan cmpared to the modern discipline so the constructed aspect is placed in the foreground. So I actually cited him a lot in my diss.

On another note, I'm currently reading a novel called John Woman and you'd probably get a kick out of it: The main character is a history professor and he's pretty much Hayden White :D

Sounds promising, I might have to check it out :)
 
I haven't. I live in the French world so my references might be different from yours. I also study in Philosophy and Classical Studies, so I read Historians talking about the process of making historical knowledge. I've mostly studied Henri-Iréné Marrou and his "de la connaissance historique" (on historical knowledge). A good part is anti-marxism because they were influential in his time in France. I also liked Paul Vayne's "comment écrit-on l'histoire ?" (How do we write history ?). He is very much influenced by Foucault. His main purpose is showing that history is radically different from science.

I guess postmoderns would be great for digging deeper in the subject. Despite tthir bad reputation (which I think is due to lazy readings), they are very well-read and I've always had an inclination towards Foucault. I like that they intersect philosophy with other branch of knowledge, because I think "pure" philosophy is a thing of the past. What was your MA about ?

Ah I see, yeah that's true me might have different references. I mentioned earlier I don't much like Paul Ricœur , but he is French, have you read his work Memory, History, Forgetting (not sure the original French title)? There are a few interesting points, but that is something I did find quite tough to read (and it was only a few sections). Of course I read it in translation but I don't much like the style.

My MA was just straight-up history, but there was a lot of theory compared to undergrad and I had some classes on concepts in history, some of which was all about the nature of historical knowledge and historical narratives, whether it's a science (as people inherited from the Van Ranke-ian view, as I mentioned above) or more related to literature. Then for my MA dissertation I wrote about a particular work of polemical history written in the 1640s to show the ways in which its narrative structure attempted to justify the English position in Ireland and fed into processes of 'New English' (the colonial class who arrived in Ireland from the 16th century century) identity formation. So Hayden White's theories were useful there, sounds like Vayne might be getting at something similar.
 
Philosophy of history is interesting, it intersects with a lot of postmodernist stuff. I had to engage with that for my MA dissertation; the nature of historical representations of the past and the way in which historical accounts are constructed.

Have you read much Hayden White?
Looking at historical accounts is my wife's area of specialty, particularly the construction of historical narratives in the Visual Arts. She started off investigating the notions of "fathers of art" and how women are omitted from the discussion for her PhD. She later expanded on some of these ideas and is know for her theory of little art/big art is which things like folk art and craft are discarded from grand narratives in modernist traditions but embraced by post modern artists as a means of revealing "little truths" that are often as poignant as the establish histories , or big truths, of a culture. One example of this is the personal "little story" of her grandmother hiding under a bridge during ww2 in poland from nazi soldiers that was published in a book someone did on my wife. Her grandmother had hiccups and whispered to her father to scare her to get rid of the hiccups so she wouldn't give away their location to the nazis. Her grandfather whispered back, "scare you, what could be more terrifying than hiding from nazis?" This story has been passed down through her family. My wife argues that this "little story" speaks, through humor, of the horrors of the second WW in the way grand narratives overlook. She argues that this personal story speaks as much about the experience of that trauma than the official account of this battle and that. Also, the use of humor is a survival coping mechanism in which they can talk about the war in ways that they normally avoid, such as talking about her grandmothers brother who was killed in the work camps.
 
I've already posted this in conversation with you, but I've got to keep spamming the good stuff ;)



On another note, I'm currently reading a novel called John Woman and you'd probably get a kick out of it: The main character is a history professor and he's pretty much Hayden White :D



More spam and still more spam. I'd apologize for the relentless spamming, but I just can't abide nonsense. That postmodernists aren't viewed as the humanities equivalent of flat earthers in science is a major failing of the humanities, but make no mistake: Their bad reputation has been earned and then some.

Also, on Foucault in particular, you know that that dude was a creepy pedo wackadoodle, right?





Out of curiosity, what do you have in mind when invoking the notion of "'pure' philosophy"? Because it seems like a straw man. If what it's meant to convey is something on the "theory" side of the "theory/practice" dichotomy - a false dichotomy, but we'll leave that to the side for the moment - then I'd still be curious to know which philosophers and/or which philosophical schools you think qualify, because, even on the basis of this conception of philosophical "purity," Confucius, Aristotle, Descartes...it doesn't appear that any of them would qualify.

(Incidentally, this is yet another one of the many ironies of postmodernism: Despite ostensibly being against "grand narratives," they're the best at concocting the grandest narratives ever conceived, from Lyotard's shtick on science to Derrida's shtick on Western metaphysics, for the purpose of showing how super enlightened and transgressive they are :rolleyes:)

I am not interested in ad hominems against Foucault. I am no expert on postmodernism and I certainly am not too interested in them. However, I have read Les mots et les choses (The Things and the words ?) By foucault and his Archeology. I don't find anything appalling in what he is saying. He looks at the episteme of one period and sees how it shapes the knowledge of that time period.
Another thing I find interesting in him is how he thinks new episteme can create new knowledge, but invariably erases some. Reading Gadamer, this becomes obvious: our scientific way of conceiving knowledge makes us incapable of seeing knowledge in the way humanists did. This results in losses in human sciences and in art. Human sciences try to imitate science and lose sight of their roots, humanism (death of man by Foucault) and art is not a credible source of knowledge anymore : it is entertainment and novels are mere fictions (though novels are not fiction in my opinion, good novels have a lot of truth in them and always refer back to reality).

By pure philosophy, I mean the grand system building. I think that is over. Now, philosophy is more "mixed". Kant created a completed philosophical system, Hegel did too, Spinoza did as well, etc.
Of course, this grand system can encompass practice, if it fits in the system.

Aristotle did not. Plato did not.
Nowadays, I see philosophy as being a good tool for people in other fields. Like the other poster who consulted philosophy for history, like another who had to to interpret some movies, etc.

Edit: btw, some people (including the leading historian of medieval philosophy, Alain de Libera, famous historian of antiquity Paul Vayne) still use the archeology of knowledge as a tool for history making. And their work is acclaimed by lots of scholars, it's not just circle jerking.
 
I am not interested in ad hominems against Foucault.

It's not like I'm saying that people shouldn't read Foucault because he was a shoplifter or refused to pay parking tickets. You don't think that one's being a pedo would inform one's work when one's work is, say, writing a multi-volume history of sexuality? Seems kind of relevant...

I am no expert on postmodernism and I certainly am not too interested in them.

Fair enough.

I have read Les mots et les choses (The Things and the words ?)

The English translation is The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences.

I don't find anything appalling in what he is saying. He looks at the episteme of one period and sees how it shapes the knowledge of that time period.

The same thing can be said about Derrida. He just looks at language and sees how its usage shapes knowledge. Very rarely do people start from terrible places. More often they take terrible routes and end up in terrible places. This is one of the harder things to communicate to people. It's easy to reduce things, even crazy things, down to the most basic and rational level, but all that has to be excluded in order to do that results in a dangerously misleading picture.

By pure philosophy, I mean the grand system building.

Gotcha. I'd call that "systematic philosophy." "Pure philosophy" is too vague.

Nowadays, I see philosophy as being a good tool for people in other fields. Like the other poster who consulted philosophy for history, like another who had to to interpret some movies, etc.

That's me. And I'm a fan of Ayn Rand's systematic philosophy of Objectivism ;)
 
I am not interested in ad hominems against Foucault. I am no expert on postmodernism and I certainly am not too interested in them. However, I have read Les mots et les choses (The Things and the words ?) By foucault and his Archeology. I don't find anything appalling in what he is saying. He looks at the episteme of one period and sees how it shapes the knowledge of that time period.
Another thing I find interesting in him is how he thinks new episteme can create new knowledge, but invariably erases some. Reading Gadamer, this becomes obvious: our scientific way of conceiving knowledge makes us incapable of seeing knowledge in the way humanists did. This results in losses in human sciences and in art. Human sciences try to imitate science and lose sight of their roots, humanism (death of man by Foucault) and art is not a credible source of knowledge anymore : it is entertainment and novels are mere fictions (though novels are not fiction in my opinion, good novels have a lot of truth in them and always refer back to reality).

By pure philosophy, I mean the grand system building. I think that is over. Now, philosophy is more "mixed". Kant created a completed philosophical system, Hegel did too, Spinoza did as well, etc.
Of course, this grand system can encompass practice, if it fits in the system.

Aristotle did not. Plato did not.
Nowadays, I see philosophy as being a good tool for people in other fields. Like the other poster who consulted philosophy for history, like another who had to to interpret some movies, etc.

Edit: btw, some people (including the leading historian of medieval philosophy, Alain de Libera, famous historian of antiquity Paul Vayne) still use the archeology of knowledge as a tool for history making. And their work is acclaimed by lots of scholars, it's not just circle jerking.

Assuming you mean me :D I also read philosophy out of personal interest as well, obviously not the same stuff lol.
 
That's me. And I'm a fan of Ayn Rand's systematic philosophy of Objectivism ;)

I haven't read her, but she has an even worst reputation then postmoderns, that's a lot. Apparently her understanding of Kant and of metaphysics is completely off. And there is something smug in calling your philosophy "objectivism", as if it you don't adhere to my philosophy, than you are not objective. She also apparently does not know the is/ought distinction. But I haven't read her, everyone says she sucks and I have a huge list of readings so no time to verify if they are right. she is not trained in philosophy so it's no wonder she ignores basic things and misreads kant.
 
I haven't read her, but she has an even worst reputation then postmoderns, that's a lot.

Oh, she has one of the worst reputations in academia. And the responses that academics have to the very mention of her name...well, let's just say that my joke Nosferatu gif does have one real-life application :D

In my book, though, that's just one more indication of how pathetically partisan, doctrinaire, and cultish academia is.

Apparently her understanding of Kant and of metaphysics is completely off.

It isn't. It's just that, because she's Ayn Rand, everything that she ever said must be deemed wrong and evil. She's actually devastatingly accurate and eerily prescient when critiquing the history of philosophy and (then and still) dominant philosophical trends.

As for Objectivism and Kant: For some context and info, here's Chris Matthew Sciabarra (the founding editor of The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies) from his book Ayn Rand: The Russian Radical:

"Rand's anti-Kantianism was an outgrowth of her exposure to Russian thought [...] Most Russian philosophers rejected Kant because they believed that he had detached the mind from reality. As I suggest, such thinkers as Solovyov, Chicherin, and Lossky were aiming for an integration of the traditional dichotomies perpetuated by Kant's metaphysics. Chicherin, for instance, argued that in Kant's system, pure concepts of reason are empty, and experience is blind. Kant's view makes 'metaphysics without experience . . . empty, and experience without metaphysics blind: in the first case we have the form without content, and in the second case, the content without understanding' [quoted by Lossky in his History of Russian Philosophy].

Interestingly, Rand's own view of the rationalist-empiricist distinction, and of Kant's critical philosophy, is deeply reminiscent of Chicherin's parody. For Rand, rationalists had embraced concepts divorced from reality, whereas empiricists had 'clung to reality, by abandoning their mind' (New Intellectual, 30). Kant's attempt to transcend this dichotomy failed miserably because his philosophy formalized the conflict. Rand writes: 'His argument, in essence, ran as follows: man is limited to a consciousness of a specific nature, which perceives by specific means and not others, therefore, his consciousness is not valid; man is blind, because he has eyes---deaf, because he has ears---deluded, because he has a mind---and the things he perceives do not exist, because he perceives them' (39).

Rand's teacher, Lossky, was the chief Russian translator of Kant's works. He too had criticized Kant's contention that true being (things-in-themselves) transcends consciousness and remains forever unknowable. Lossky sought to defend the realist proposition that people could know true reality through an epistemological coordination of subject and object. In this process, the real existents and objects of the world are subjected to a cognitive activity that is metaphysically passive and noncreative. Lossky rejected Kant's belief that the mind imposes structures on reality. Such Kantian subjectivism subordinates reality to knowledge, or existence to consciousness. It resolves phenomena in subjective processes that are detached from the real world and distortive of objective reality [from Lossky's book, The Intuitive Basis of Knowledge].

Furthermore, Lossky criticized Kant for invalidating metaphysics as a science. Since Kant held that the mind perceives things not as they are but 'as they seem to me,' he institutionalized a war not only on metaphysics, but on the very ability of the mind to grasp the nature of reality. Though there is no evidence that Rand studied Kant formally while at the university, it is conceivable that her earliest exposure to Kant's ideas occurred in her encounters with the celebrated Lossky. Her distinguished teacher was among the foremost Russian scholars of German philosophy [and] Lossky's rejection of Kantianism was essential to his ideal-realist project."

I'd also recommend Leonard Peikoff's cogent critique of the analytic-synthetic/necessary-contingent dichotomy as a good example of the grounds of Objectivism's rejection of Kantian philosophy. You can also check out Stephen R.C. Hicks' eminently readable Explaining Postmodernism for a lucid take on Kant in a similar vein.

And there is something smug in calling your philosophy "objectivism", as if it you don't adhere to my philosophy, than you are not objective.

Well the point is that objectivity is the watchword, so, just as Positivism is all about positive knowledge, hence its name, Rand was all about objectivity, hence the name Objectivism.

She also apparently does not know the is/ought distinction.

She knows it. She just thinks it's hooey. From her 1964 book The Virtue of Selfishness:

"In answer to those philosophers who claim that no relation can be established between ultimate ends or values and the facts of reality, let me stress that the fact that living entities exist and function necessitates the existence of values and of an ultimate value, which, for any given living entity, is its own life. Thus the validation of value judgments is to be achieved by reference to the facts of reality. The fact that a living entity is, determines what it ought to do. So much for the issue of the relation between 'is' and 'ought.'"

But I haven't read her, everyone says she sucks and I have a huge list of readings so no time to verify if they are right. she is not trained in philosophy so it's no wonder she ignores basic things and misreads kant.

So you haven't read her, you have no intention of ever reading her, and you're totally cool with taking on faith the claims of others that everything that she ever said was wrong?

dr-evil-right.gif


Mind you, I'm not here to "convert" you or to persuade you to drop what you're doing and start reading Atlas Shrugged. Do what you want. I'm just pointing out shit that seems problematic.
 
Oh, she has one of the worst reputations in academia. And the responses that academics have to the very mention of her name...well, let's just say that my joke Nosferatu gif does have one real-life application :D

In my book, though, that's just one more indication of how pathetically partisan, doctrinaire, and cultish academia is.



It isn't. It's just that, because she's Ayn Rand, everything that she ever said must be deemed wrong and evil. She's actually devastatingly accurate and eerily prescient when critiquing the history of philosophy and (then and still) dominant philosophical trends.

As for Objectivism and Kant: For some context and info, here's Chris Matthew Sciabarra (the founding editor of The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies) from his book Ayn Rand: The Russian Radical:

"Rand's anti-Kantianism was an outgrowth of her exposure to Russian thought [...] Most Russian philosophers rejected Kant because they believed that he had detached the mind from reality. As I suggest, such thinkers as Solovyov, Chicherin, and Lossky were aiming for an integration of the traditional dichotomies perpetuated by Kant's metaphysics. Chicherin, for instance, argued that in Kant's system, pure concepts of reason are empty, and experience is blind. Kant's view makes 'metaphysics without experience . . . empty, and experience without metaphysics blind: in the first case we have the form without content, and in the second case, the content without understanding' [quoted by Lossky in his History of Russian Philosophy].

Interestingly, Rand's own view of the rationalist-empiricist distinction, and of Kant's critical philosophy, is deeply reminiscent of Chicherin's parody. For Rand, rationalists had embraced concepts divorced from reality, whereas empiricists had 'clung to reality, by abandoning their mind' (New Intellectual, 30). Kant's attempt to transcend this dichotomy failed miserably because his philosophy formalized the conflict. Rand writes: 'His argument, in essence, ran as follows: man is limited to a consciousness of a specific nature, which perceives by specific means and not others, therefore, his consciousness is not valid; man is blind, because he has eyes---deaf, because he has ears---deluded, because he has a mind---and the things he perceives do not exist, because he perceives them' (39).

Rand's teacher, Lossky, was the chief Russian translator of Kant's works. He too had criticized Kant's contention that true being (things-in-themselves) transcends consciousness and remains forever unknowable. Lossky sought to defend the realist proposition that people could know true reality through an epistemological coordination of subject and object. In this process, the real existents and objects of the world are subjected to a cognitive activity that is metaphysically passive and noncreative. Lossky rejected Kant's belief that the mind imposes structures on reality. Such Kantian subjectivism subordinates reality to knowledge, or existence to consciousness. It resolves phenomena in subjective processes that are detached from the real world and distortive of objective reality [from Lossky's book, The Intuitive Basis of Knowledge].

Furthermore, Lossky criticized Kant for invalidating metaphysics as a science. Since Kant held that the mind perceives things not as they are but 'as they seem to me,' he institutionalized a war not only on metaphysics, but on the very ability of the mind to grasp the nature of reality. Though there is no evidence that Rand studied Kant formally while at the university, it is conceivable that her earliest exposure to Kant's ideas occurred in her encounters with the celebrated Lossky. Her distinguished teacher was among the foremost Russian scholars of German philosophy [and] Lossky's rejection of Kantianism was essential to his ideal-realist project."

I'd also recommend Leonard Peikoff's cogent critique of the analytic-synthetic/necessary-contingent dichotomy as a good example of the grounds of Objectivism's rejection of Kantian philosophy. You can also check out Stephen R.C. Hicks' eminently readable Explaining Postmodernism for a lucid take on Kant in a similar vein.



Well the point is that objectivity is the watchword, so, just as Positivism is all about positive knowledge, hence its name, Rand was all about objectivity, hence the name Objectivism.



She knows it. She just thinks it's hooey. From her 1964 book The Virtue of Selfishness:

"In answer to those philosophers who claim that no relation can be established between ultimate ends or values and the facts of reality, let me stress that the fact that living entities exist and function necessitates the existence of values and of an ultimate value, which, for any given living entity, is its own life. Thus the validation of value judgments is to be achieved by reference to the facts of reality. The fact that a living entity is, determines what it ought to do. So much for the issue of the relation between 'is' and 'ought.'"



So you haven't read her, you have no intention of ever reading her, and you're totally cool with taking on faith the claims of others that everything that she ever said was wrong?

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Mind you, I'm not here to "convert" you or to persuade you to drop what you're doing and start reading Atlas Shrugged. Do what you want. I'm just pointing out shit that seems problematic.


You lost me at mentioning Stephen Hicks book. That book is a pile of nonsense, with 0 credibility. In the very first page he says Catherine MacKinnon is a postmodernist. That girl has an article called "points against postmodernism". His table of medieval philosophy is complete horseshit. He categorizes Kant as anti-reason.
There's a reason why it's not a Cambridge Universiry press book : it is full of errors. I thought you were a good person to talk with, but you should really read other things. I understand why your take on postmodernism is so pejorative now. Hicks interpreted the death of man by Foucault to mean he wanted to kill mankin, how can you be so bad at understanding?

As for your last point: indeed, I don't have time to read every philosopher, I don't see how it is a knock against me. Professionally, I have to read all of Plato and Aristotle in Greek, then plow through Arabic Philosophy in Arabic, than read tons of Latin scholastic. On the side i have some time for top tier philosophers.
 
You lost me at mentioning Stephen Hicks book. That book is a pile of nonsense, with 0 credibility. In the very first page he says Catherine MacKinnon is a postmodernist. That girl has an article called "points against postmodernism". His table of medieval philosophy is complete horseshit. He categorizes Kant as anti-reason.
There's a reason why it's not a Cambridge Universiry press book : it is full of errors.

1) MacKinnon wrote an essay explicitly coming out against postmodernism in 2000. Hicks critiques a book that she wrote in 1993, alleging that her "logic" regarding her crusade to make porn illegal was symptomatic of postmodernist "logic." If you've read Hicks' book and the book of MacKinnon's that he's critiquing, then you wouldn't consider what he has to say to be in error. You don't have to be a proud, flag-waving postmodernist for your thinking to be infused with/infected by postmodernism.

2) Why is his table of medieval philosophy "complete horseshit"? That's not a rhetorical question, by the way. Thus far, slurs, invectives, and appeals to authority have been pinch-hitting for critical arguments in your posts. I'm at least articulating the grounds for my positions and posting the thousands of words that I've written in different essays backing my shit up. I'd be curious to see you actually make a case for something rather than just pointing out that Hicks' book wasn't published by Cambridge University Press :rolleyes:

3) When a guy comes right out and says that he wants to "deny knowledge in order to make room for faith" and uses the Biblical story of Babel as the reason why we should all be good religious zealots and side with faith, how is categorizing him as anti-reason an error? Hell, even Nietzsche saw through Kant's bullshit and denounced his philosophical project as part of a "cunning theology" and considered the "success" of his philosophical work "merely a theologian's success."

I thought you were a good person to talk with, but you should really read other things.

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As for your last point: indeed, I don't have time to read every philosopher, I don't see how it is a knock against me.

You don't have to read every philosopher. But surely it's not too much to ask to hold off on deciding that someone's writing is a crock until you've actually...you know...read it, is it?
 
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