I have a problem with crediting a very well known principle to someone else.
I wasn't crediting her as the creator of the idea - you could really go back all the way to Aristotle and find similar epistemological rules of thumb - I was attributing the specific words in the formulation that I put in quotes to her as an indication that the words in quotes were her words, not my own.
I don't believe any philosophy is irrational, else it would not be philosophy.
Philosophy is an activity, not a result. The activity is thinking, the result is (hopefully) rational thought...but that's not always what results. The simple dictionary definition of "irrational" is "not logical or reasonable." There really isn't a single philosopher or philosophy who/that you'd call illogical or unreasonable for a single reason? Seriously?
Stay tuned for me and
Caveat's discussion. This issue will come up again and I'll go into more detail as to why I find it so objectionable.
Your questions seem to miss my point. Whether or not I think there are good and bad irrational thinkers, irrational is clearly a pejorative term. Labeling your "ennemies" with such terms is a quick way to discredit them.
Well, sure, it's better to be rational than irrational. But "irrational" is still an adjective that can - and should - be used to describe philosophers/philosophies who/that are not logical or reasonable.
Again, more on that below in my conversation with
Caveat.
Your above discussion seem to miss the real point of stoic ethics. The first words of the Manual is : some things are up to us, some things are not (loose translation).
Have I missed the point or do I just not agree with the point? It seems like I've got a handle on what it is and what it preaches and just don't value it much.
Epictetus was a slave and happy while tortured. What is not in your control should not affect you.
See? This is what I'm saying. This is some Serenity Now shit. I get it, I just don't agree with it. Imagine telling Spartacus to just be happy, he can't control being a slave...
Edit : you also seem to mistake negation with opposite. Death is "no-life", not the opposite of life. No-white is not necessarily black. Not-great (assuming life is great) is not the opposite of great (miserable).
This is a distinction without a difference. End of life, negation of life, opposite of life...call it what you want: It isn't life therefore it sucks.
Edit2: I am also not sure opposites entice opposite states. The opposite of temerity is cowardice. Both are bad states of being. One because it is excess, the other because it is lacking.
This is the "mean" idea that's prevalent in both Western and Eastern philosophy. I have no objections to this. If you go the "lesser evil" route, then, though neither temerity nor cowardice is ideal, I'd rather have/be around someone who has temerity than be/be around someone who is a coward.
We're all in this together kumbaya guy.
That HAS to be a more explicit outline somewhere of the contribution of philosophical innovations to the development of the Western world, I just need to figure out what exactly to google. I suppose most intellectual histories are essentially that, they just tend to be a little vague, so please don't throw Russell at me (though I approve of the earlier citations
@faustian).
I can't think of anything, and that's actually kind of sad.
Hahaha. I think that your fixation with Objectivism is interfering with your openness to this belief system.
I'll let
Eric Weinstein answer this for me.
Also, keep in mind that psychological science is more a descriptive enterprise than a normative one. So you might find a psychologist who will agree that perspectives about certain problems can be manipulated, but you won't find many telling you how exactly you should manipulate them.
Fair enough. But people like Carl Rogers, while they wouldn't just tell
everyone how to "manipulate problems,"
would tell
specific people how to manipulate
their problems, right? It's case-by-case, but you can still determine better/worse and right/wrong case-by-case, no?
I'll explain as best I can in my own language [...] I'll leave it at that for now to see if you agree with how I've paraphrased her position.
You've got the gist. Now I'll go through the specifics here and then the ball will be in your court.
This is a strictly logical problem
One of the major tenets of Objectivism is that there's no such thing as a "strictly logical" problem if what is meant by that is that it only exists in some "theoretical" realm with absolutely no contact with any "practical" realm. In her essay "Philosophical Detection," Rand wrote the following:
"'This may be good in theory, but it doesn’t work in practice.' What is a theory? It is a set of abstract principles purporting to be either a correct description of reality or a set of guidelines for man's actions. Correspondence to reality is the standard of value by which one estimates a theory. If a theory is inapplicable to reality, by what standard can it be estimated as 'good'? If one were to accept that notion, it would mean: a. that the activity of man's mind is unrelated to reality; b. that the purpose of thinking is neither to acquire knowledge nor to guide man's actions."
So, if the concept of a "strictly logical" problem has any real meaning, it's that it isn't a real problem.
I suspect from my brief skimming of Rand's thought that she dismisses the problem the same way Sam Harris does in The Moral Landscape.
Still haven't gotten around to reading any of Harris' stuff but you write clearly so I'm sure I'll be able to follow along...
First, re-articulating the problem above - if facts are unequivocally objective (we'll accept that for now), but values can't be derived from facts, how can we derive objective values?
To make sure that I'm following, I have to ask: Where did the "values can't be derived from facts" premise come from? I'll grant it for argument's sake here, but, by "re-articulating the problem," are you identifying as the problem that "values can't be derived from facts"?
Here's one way:
Good syllogism:
1. [Universal objective value]
2. [Fact]
3. [Normative conclusion]
Personally, I'd have it:
1. [Objective value]
2. [Fact]
3. [Objective conclusion]
"Universal" is redundant in #1 and "Normative" allows for subjective wiggle room. But, I digress...
Rand's universal objective value is something like "promoting the life of the organism is good," which, to her credit, is at least clear.
Pretty much. Promoting life is the baseline, the bare minimum, while, in an Aristotelian vein, eudaimonia, or "flourishing," is the height to which we should aspire (hence my characterization of Objectivism as a perfectionist philosophy).
Sam's is something like "whatever is a universal objective value is good" because he's a goof.
Clarity and comedy: My favorite combination
With the above structure, Rand gets to derive all sorts of normative conclusions from facts because the universal objective value can't be denied.
Just to be clear, what do you mean by "can't be denied"? Assuming I know what you mean, this is a perfect example to explain why the theory/practice dichotomy is a false one and why the is-ought "problem" isn't a problem. It's not that you
can't deny it - the way that a computer
can't not turn on when you press the Power button (provided it's functioning, it has a working battery/full charge, yada yada yada) - it's that you can't deny it
and live to your fullest potential. People
can deny that promoting life is a value - those are the people who kill themselves. People
can deny that working to flourish is a value - those are the people who lead lives of quiet desperation à la Thoreau.
As near as I can tell - this is for you, as well,
French Canadian - the problem that people have with words like "objective," "logical," "rational," etc., is that they allow for judgments to be made on the basis of which some people are judged as
not being objective,
not being logical,
not being rational, etc. That's why people - from all walks of life, of all stripes - take comfort in relativism (even if they proclaim themselves hostile to relativism), that's why people like stupid ideas like "That's
your truth," thereby destroying the concept of "truth," or "Whatever's good for you is good," thereby destroying the concept of "good," etc.: It allows them an intellectual and moral "safe space" in which to live their lives.
As is usually the case, I'm with Rand. Because it's short, I'm just going to post her entire essay from
The Virtue of Selfishness entitled "How Does One Lead a Rational Life in an Irrational Society?":
"I will confine my answer to a single, fundamental aspect of this question. I will name only one principle, the opposite of the idea which is so prevalent today and which is responsible for the spread of evil in the world. That principle is:
One must never fail to pronounce moral judgment.
Nothing can corrupt and disintegrate a culture or a man’s character as thoroughly as does the precept of
moral agnosticism, the idea that one must never pass moral judgment on others, that one must be morally tolerant of anything, that the good consists of never distinguishing good from evil.
It is obvious who profits and who loses by such a precept. It is not justice or equal treatment that you grant to men when you abstain equally from praising men’s virtues and from condemning men’s vices. When your impartial attitude declares, in effect, that neither the good nor the evil may expect anything from you—whom do you betray and whom do you encourage?
But to pronounce moral judgment is an enormous responsibility. To be a judge, one must possess an unimpeachable character; one need not be omniscient or infallible, and it is not an issue of errors of knowledge; one needs an un-breached integrity, that is, the absence of any indulgence in conscious, willful evil. Just as a judge in a court of law may err, when the evidence is inconclusive, but may not evade the evidence available, nor accept bribes, nor allow any personal feeling, emotion, desire or fear to obstruct his mind’s judgment of the facts of reality—so every rational person must maintain an equally strict and solemn integrity in the courtroom within his own mind, where the responsibility is more awesome than in a public tribunal, because
he, the judge, is the only one to know when he has been impeached.
There is, however, a court of appeal from one’s judgments: objective reality. A judge puts himself on trial every time he pronounces a verdict. It is only in today’s reign of amoral cynicism, subjectivism and hooliganism that men may imagine themselves free to utter any sort of irrational judgment and to suffer no consequences. But, in fact, a man is to be judged by the judgments he pronounces. The things which he condemns or extols exist in objective reality and are open to the independent appraisal of others. It is his own moral character and standards that he reveals, when he blames or praises. If he condemns America and extols Soviet Russia—or if he attacks businessmen and defends juvenile delinquents—or if he denounces a great work of art and praises trash—it is the nature of his own soul that he confesses.
It is their fear of
this responsibility that prompts most people to adopt an attitude of indiscriminate moral neutrality. It is the fear best expressed in the precept: 'Judge not, that ye be not judged.' But that precept, in fact, is an abdication of moral responsibility: it is a moral blank check one gives to others in exchange for a moral blank check one expects for oneself.
There is no escape from the fact that men have to make choices; so long as men have to make choices, there is no escape from moral values; so long as moral values are at stake, no moral neutrality is possible. To abstain from condemning a torturer, is to become an accessory to the torture and murder of his victims.
The moral principle to adopt in this issue, is: '
Judge, and be prepared to be judged.'
The opposite of moral neutrality is not a blind, arbitrary, self-righteous condemnation of any idea, action or person that does not fit one’s mood, one’s memorized slogans or one’s snap judgment of the moment. Indiscriminate tolerance and indiscriminate condemnation are not two opposites: they are two variants of the same evasion. To declare that 'everybody is white' or 'everybody is black' or 'everybody is neither white nor black, but gray,' is not a moral judgment, but an escape from the responsibility of moral judgment.
To judge means: to evaluate a given concrete by reference to an abstract principle or standard. It is not an easy task; it is not a task that can be performed automatically by one’s feelings, 'instincts' or hunches. It is a task that requires the most precise, the most exacting, the most ruthlessly objective and
rational process of thought. It is fairly easy to grasp abstract moral principles; it can be very difficult to apply them to a given situation, particularly when it involves the moral character of another person. When one pronounces moral judgment, whether in praise or in blame, one must be prepared to answer 'Why?' and to prove one’s case—to oneself and to any rational inquirer.
The policy of always pronouncing moral judgment does not mean that one must regard oneself as a missionary charged with the responsibility of 'saving everyone’s soul'—nor that one must give unsolicited moral appraisals to all those one meets. It means: (a) that one must know clearly, in full, verbally identified form, one’s own moral evaluation of every person, issue and event with which one deals, and act accordingly; (b) that one must make one’s moral evaluation known to others, when it is rationally appropriate to do so.
This last means that one need not launch into unprovoked moral denunciations or debates, but that one must speak up in situations where silence can objectively be taken to mean agreement with or sanction of evil. When one deals with irrational persons, where argument is futile, a mere 'I don’t agree with you' is sufficient to negate any implication of moral sanction. When one deals with better people, a full statement of one’s views may be morally required. But in no case and in no situation may one permit one’s own values to be attacked or denounced, and keep silent.
Moral values are the motive power of a man’s actions. By pronouncing moral judgment, one protects the clarity of one’s own perception and the rationality of the course one chooses to pursue. It makes a difference whether one thinks that one is dealing with human errors of knowledge or with human evil.
Observe how many people evade, rationalize and drive their minds into a state of blind stupor, in dread of discovering that those they deal with—their 'loved ones' or friends or business associates or political rulers—are not merely mistaken, but
evil. Observe that this dread leads them to sanction, to help and to spread the very evil whose existence they fear to acknowledge.
If people did not indulge in such abject evasions as the claim that some contemptible liar 'means well'—that a mooching bum 'can’t help it'—that a juvenile delinquent 'needs love'—that a criminal 'doesn’t know any better'—that a power-seeking politician is moved by patriotic concern for 'the public good'—that communists are merely 'agrarian reformers'—the history of the past few decades, or centuries, would have been different.
Ask yourself why totalitarian dictatorships find it necessary to pour money and effort into propaganda for their own helpless, chained, gagged slaves, who have no means of protest or defense. The answer is that even the humblest peasant or the lowest savage would rise in blind rebellion, were he to realize that he is being immolated, not to some incomprehensible 'noble purpose,' but to plain, naked human evil.
Observe also that moral neutrality necessitates a progressive sympathy for vice and a progressive antagonism to virtue. A man who struggles not to acknowledge that evil is evil, finds it increasingly dangerous to acknowledge that the good is the good. To him, a person of virtue is a threat that can topple all of his evasions—particularly when an issue of justice is involved, which demands that he take sides. It is then that such formulas as 'Nobody is ever fully right or fully wrong' and 'Who am I to judge?' take their lethal effect. The man who begins by saying: 'There is some good in the worst of us,' goes on to say: 'There is some bad in the best of us'—then: 'There’s
got to be some bad in the best of us'—and then: 'It’s the best of us who make life difficult—why don’t they keep silent?—who are
they to judge?'
And then, on some gray, middle-aged morning, such a man realizes suddenly that he has betrayed all the values he had loved in his distant spring, and wonders how it happened, and slams his mind shut to the answer, by telling himself hastily that the fear he had felt in his worst, most shameful moments was right and that values have no chance in this world.
An irrational society is a society of moral cowards—of men paralyzed by the loss of moral standards, principles and goals. But since men have to act, so long as they live, such a society is ready to be taken over by anyone willing to set its direction. The initiative can come from only two types of men: either from the man who is willing to assume the responsibility of asserting rational values—or from the thug who is not troubled by questions of responsibility.
No matter how hard the struggle, there is only one choice that a rational man can make in the face of such an alternative."
The second scenario should only be ridiculous to you under the assumption that there is no afterlife, which isn't explicitly stated in your thought experiment. That seems to be your opinion, so it was probably an unstated assumption, but I felt it was worth pointing out just in case.
Yeah, that thought experiment was to make more explicitly a point that I was making earlier in a context where I'd established that I don't believe in an afterlife.
Anyways, this has nothing to do with stoicism, but my impression is that your perspective on life and death is the result failure of imagination. That's not to say I believe you're unable to imagine some of the worst situations one could find themselves in, but it isn't clear to me that you're imagining yourself in them in any real sense.
Give me a "for instance" that you think would force me to contradict what I've already said. With the example of
The Grey, I explained that it makes sense to accept death. What's the alternative? It's simply logical. But what would a "for instance" be where I'd rather be dead than alive? To bring back an earlier example: If I were Spartacus, or with Spartacus, I would never even entertain the idea of suicide. Maybe I'll break out, or maybe someone else will break out and I'll break out with him, or maybe I'll be an awesome gladiator and fight my way to freedom. There are a million different alternatives any of which is better than suicide.
How about Conan? Fuck it, I'd push that fucking wheel. Maybe I wouldn't turn into Arnold Schwarzenegger, maybe I'd die from exhaustion/dehydration while pushing - then I'd push it to my last step, my last breath, because that last step and that last breath is life and that's what I'll always push for.
Hell, even in those cliche action movies scenes where the bad guy tells the hero that he's going to cause him so much pain that he's going to beg to be killed, I always think to myself, "Who the fuck would do that? Why wouldn't you at least go down fighting, i.e. go down trying to preserve your life?"
If it really is a failure of imagination, then help my imagination along and give me some "for instances" to consider.
Assuming death is nothingness, it is an inherently neutral experience, and, as such, the conclusion that life is better than death implies that life is an inherently positive experience.
Yes. Something is better than nothing. Who disagrees with that?
I would like you to explain to me how reaching a point in life where you lose the ability to do or experience anything you enjoy, are in multiple forms of constant pain-discomfort and are losing what you consider to be "yourself" piece by piece is positive.
You'll have to be more specific. Are we talking about someone in a persistent vegetative state, someone who's deteriorating and for whom there's no possibility of survival, someone for whom brain activity is limited to mere sensation of physical pain? In this case, this person has dropped below the level of humanity (hence the term "vegetable") and if it's not medically possible to bring that person back to humanity then that person is for all intents and purposes dead. Of course, if I'm that person, I'd hope that my family would exhaust every possibility before pulling the plug, but if there's nothing to be done, then isn't this essentially the same as the example of
The Grey? There's nothing to fight against, there's no fight to be won, so there's no logic in fighting.
But if we're talking about a quadriplegic, or a cancer patient doing chemo, or Ronnie Coleman from his Netflix doc, or any shit like that, that's still life and I'll take it.
I have not been arguing that Confucianism does not have anything to offer regarding personal virtue or moral conduct, only that the Confucian ethics are thoroughly collectivist.
So we're each in agreement about what the other is saying?
Is there really a difference between good and bad philosophy as suggested?
Yes. Because there's a difference between good and bad. That means that there's a difference between good and bad food, good and bad movies, good and bad music, good and bad sex, and good and bad philosophy. How could it be otherwise?
After all philosophy is simply asking questions that many never be answered.
The fact that all of humanity may never agree unanimously on which philosophy/ies are better than (an)other philosophy/ies doesn't mean that some philosophies aren't better than some other philosophies. It just means that there's going to be disagreements and that people will be required to use logic and clear argumentation to explain what's good/right and what's wrong/bad and why. No?
No, science is science. That's why it's called science
I know that I'm going out of order, but this part from one of your recent posts is the main theme of your posts, so I'll start with this and respond by saying: Truth isn't what you think it is, that's for sure.
Space and time are not real. Our theories are not real.
The only way that they're "not real" is if you have a seriously bizarre definition of "real."
A tree falling in the woods without humans does not make a sound because our abstract theories wouldn't exist to explain it.
I don't think that you realize that the way that you've formulated this nonsense proves that it's nonsense. Whether or not we're here to construct theories to explain "it" - whatever "it" is from example to example, whether a tree falling down in this example or the phenomenon of causality in your previous example - the very fact that you're speaking of an "it" to be explained presupposes the (real, truthful) existence of said "it."
This is a fallacious conception of truth that Noël Carroll refuted under the heading of "the final word conception of truth." From his book
On Criticism:
"Now we are playing with a very special and, I suspect, extravagant and ultimately untrustworthy notion of
truth. Call it 'the final word conception of truth' - whereby a proposition about some state of affairs x is true if and only if that proposition exhausts x to such an extent that there is nothing left to be said about x, once we have delivered the 'final word.' But the 'final word conception of truth' is simply a nonstarter. At the very least, it is utopian. For, there is no inquiry in which some observation necessarily counts as the last word, precluding any further comment. This is indubitably true of description. There is no landscape that can be exhaustively described. There is always the view from Alpha Centauri or from an indefinitely large number of elsewheres that are ever game. The only reason that [the 'final word conception of truth] gains any credibility is probably on the basis of a phony conception of truth."
We still do not know where the urge for truth comes from
Once again, your language is betraying you. Or would you maintain that "the urge for truth" isn't real, isn't a true description of a human urge, etc.?
