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Ok, so it's a historically contingent exclusiveness that's the problem. That I can work with since it is, ultimately, contingent and there's no absolute reason to have them excluding each other.
I think Sam's response to this would be "Even if we only came to accept Newtonian truth as the absolute truth at the end of this process, it was truth all along, and we were previously in error."
I think Peterson's response to this - and he may actually make it at some point - is that scientific/Newtonian truth would only be accepted as a dominant conception of truth insofar as it fulfills the conditions of Darwinian truths - that it keeps on spitting out answers that are "true enough" in a Darwinian sense. Essentially, I suspect he would say "Newtonian truth is so popular only because it consistently accomplishes what Darwinian truth." This may hinge on two different starting points for them - Harris proceeding from a concern for what is true, and Peterson proceeding from a concern for what.
I think you're right about both here.
The concept of "Darwinian truth" is pretty soft as Peterson uses it - I don't think he's confident about how exactly it should be employed, partly because he seems to still be thinking about it and partly because the "truth" that's ultimately compatible with survival is bound to be fairly variable and hence imprecise.
Harris is able to speak much more fluently about scientific truth because it is extremely precise and because he's not interested in the ad abdsurdum consequences of adopting it completely (likely because he's so steeped in refuting religion that this problem seems lightyears away). Plenty of so-called "scientific rationalists" (NDT comes to mind) are guilty of this is well.
Oh. This captures what I suspect Peterson might have responded with. I'll have to look up this Alvin Platinga fellow...
I'm not sure I believe it either, and I do think that Nietzsche is providing a more thoughtful treatment of this issue. The more I think about this, the more I think that the issue is one of describing a perceived absolute truth, versus a description of describing how human beings actually arrive at truth.
Harris will say "there is an absolute truth independent of human observation or consideration."
Peterson will say "That's not how people determine what's true - it's a product of relation to a nested teleological end, and that end comes from a biological substrate. What what humans, in practice, determine to be truths will be things that achieve that end, and their degree of truth is based on their
Nietzsche's response would be "Peterson's description of human activity is right but his model of truth is wrong. Why would you call that truth rather than merely an end beneficial to life? Everything you call truth could very well be an error that is beneficial to life, and a standard of value derived from that benefit doesn't actually reveal a thing's truth, whatever we call it."
I think Sam's model of truth has more claim to be right, but it may be inconsequential because Peterson's observation about human behaviour is right - but he goes too far in calling it truth. It's potentially a very useful descriptive model though.
Of the 3 above I probably agree with Nietzsche the most, since Peterson at times seems to be forcing the contradiction between Newtonian truth and Darwinian truth.
I think the reason he wants to do this is because pure scientific truth is untenable, so there must be some relationship between the two even if you can't exactly use both to solve the same problems.
He also seems to invoke some aspect of group selection, since Darwinian truth includes an element of social stability. It could very well be the case that the Darwinian truth properly executed on the individual level leads to collective disaster. That's not incompatible with evolution at all imo.
That's a very good thought on this. "The worst possible situation for everyone" does seem to have a bit of a "Darwinian truth" ring to it, as I'm not sure that a scientific viewpoint could arrive at a "worst possible scenario." I've heard Sam give some lame argument about people getting their arms cut off but he fails to deal with any sort of nuance around that issue, about deviant, utilitarian, or just competing values. The day I get shot is probably a bad day - unless I get shot to save my child's life. Then it might be a good day, all things considered. The valuation of the good or bad comes from a variety of places and it's not nearly as clear cut as I've seen him present...
Yea that line was one of the many annoyances from Harris' The Moral Landscape. It's literally a meta-ethical placeholder despite him denying that he's doing meta-ethics or merely place-holding anything.
It actually reminds me a bit of the very beginning of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, when he introduces the concept of eudaimonia. Eudaimonia is similarly a term meant to outline the form of the greatest possible good, whatever it happens to be, which Aristotle then proceeds to fill in with content through the rest of the book.
Harris doesn't actually fill in the content. He just says that whatever all-encompassing "bad" qualities this situations turns out to have, moving away from it will be good, and science can dictate the method for doing that.
Yes. And now I have to put some thought into how to phrase a response to your question about foundation about values in that other thread. Hrm... It really does hinge on whether we're talking about a foundation of values that are credible in an absolute sense, or whether we're talking about functional values that are not absolutely defensible, in which case we have to wade into the mire of postmodernism and pick out a hill to stand on. Will get back to you.
Sweet! And don't forget the follow-up question too