Sam Harris on free will

[Cubo de Sangre]

I don't think it's all or nothing though. Obviously there is a lot that goes on subconsciously that affects thoughts, but does it completely negate free will or does it just influence it?

If it was completely negated, I don't see the point of consciousness.

He didn't respond to me. Better luck to you.

 

[SexyMahnaz]

There is scientific evidence that the brain makes decisions before they reach the level of consciousness.

The implications of this are incompatible with how we organize society, though, so we ignore this largely (as we should).

Nailed it. I think he's probably right, but what are we going to do? Tear it all down & try start again without one of if not the most fundamental pillars civilization? yeah nah

 

[trustno1]

I don't think it's all or nothing though. Obviously there is a lot that goes on subconsciously that affects thoughts, but does it completely negate free will or does it just influence it?

If it was completely negated, I don't see the point of consciousness.

Another thing that came to my mind on the topic is when I was reading research on schizophrenia and religion. Basically, the symptoms can alternate depending on the culture, religion and other outside influences from the place you're from. And even then you have percentages meaning these influences don't have the same effect for everybody. People have different characters/moral codes/beliefs/existential philosophy etc. They can use their will and have positive results, especially combined with the medication.

Some may say it's the genes that cause you to react a certain way to schizophrenia and not your will and all that I mentioned. But aren't the genes another influence that has its effect on you (that can be pretty strong), but you still can reflect on it with your will/mind. I have a bit of a shitty example, but - let's say you have some gene(s) that makes you dislike some food. It might be disgusting to you, but If are really determined you can still try and eat it, regardless of the "unexplainable disgust". Isn't that free will?

 

[ShinkanPo]

Ham Sarris!!!

 

[luckyshot]

What are the physical theories based upon?

Physical evidence.

Of course things like abstract concepts are immaterial.

I'm talking about evidence.

Ok. I’ll take another stab at this... if you give a obtuse reply, I’m done.

Is a statement like, “That water is too hot, be careful!” clear and intelligible? Does it communicate knowledge?

Of course it is, and of course it does. It communicates the sort of practical consideration that was probably the impetus for the development of language in the first place.

But is it an abstract concept or a physical one?

Actually, it is both.

The WATER is not, technically speaking “too hot” or even “hot.” It is the subjective experience of an OBSERVER that the water is hot.

In an objective sense all we can say is that the water has a temperature.

Does this make the subjective statement “That water is too hot!” any less clear, intelligible or pragmatically true?

Of course not.

Is the statement based on an experience that could be called “evidence”?

Of course it is.

So different types of “truth” clearly exist.

As Kant pointed out a long time ago, there are a priori truths, a posteriori truths, and synthetic truths. If you are not familiar with those terms, I suggest you start there.

While there are seemingly infinite philosophical considerations, Harris took the question from a neuroscientific approach.

It is incredibly interesting and revealing, and even if he isn't "right" I hope to see a lot more research done on this topic.

Research of the brain and AI is the new frontier for questions of consciousness. I think ignoring new research on strict philosophical grounds is incredibly foolhardy and limiting. I say lets see where this goes. Let the debate continue; you can't deny the paradigm shifts in philosophy caused by neuroscientific research.

A couple of things:

1. Agree that the conversation and research should continue. And, barring some sort of dark age, of course it will.

2. I have no problem with Harris taking a neuroscience approach. I have a problem with him presenting this approach as if it is philosophy.

3. In a larger sense I have a problem with the popularizers of “new sciences” who have, in my opinion, sought to prematurely call the fight between neuroscience and philosophy, in particular, and the humanities, in general.

They have declared, or at least strongly implied, that the neuroscientific approach will, in time, render all philosophical questions moot and “demystify” such concepts and free will and consciousness...

And all this despite not having produced one iota of evidence regarding how conscious experience is produced strictly from matter (the materialist foundational assumption) much less being able to replicate the same.

At what level does the argument, “We just need more and better measurements of neurons and then we will understand consciousness,” start to sound suspiciously like voodoo economics?

And once again, I’m not discouraging the materialist approach. But I’m far from convinced by it, and I think it’s proponents should make sure their claims don’t put the cart ahead of the horse.

 

[ShadBo]

Ok. I’ll take another stab at this... if you give a obtuse reply, I’m done.

Is a statement like, “That water is too hot, be careful!” clear and intelligible? Does it communicate knowledge?

Of course it is, and of course it does. It communicates the sort of practical consideration that was probably the impetus for the development of language in the first place.

But is it an abstract concept or a physical one?

Actually, it is both.

The WATER is not, technically speaking “too hot” or even “hot.” It is the subjective experience of an OBSERVER that the water is hot.

In an objective sense all we can say is that the water has a temperature.

Does this make the subjective statement “That water is too hot!” any less clear, intelligible or pragmatically true?

Of course not.

Is the statement based on an experience that could be called “evidence”?

Of course it is.

So different types of “truth” clearly exist.

As Kant pointed out a long time ago, there are a priori truths, a posteriori truths, and synthetic truths. If you are not familiar with those terms, I suggest you start there.



A couple of things:

1. Agree that the conversation and research should continue. And, barring some sort of dark age, of course it will.

2. I have no problem with Harris taking a neuroscience approach. I have a problem with him presenting this approach as if it is philosophy.

3. In a larger sense I have a problem with the popularizers of “new sciences” who have, in my opinion, sought to prematurely call the fight between neuroscience and philosophy, in particular, and the humanities, in general.

They have declared, or at least strongly implied, that the neuroscientific approach will, in time, render all philosophical questions moot and “demystify” such concepts and free will and consciousness...

And all this despite not having produced one iota of evidence regarding how conscious experience is produced strictly from matter (the materialist foundational assumption) much less being able to replicate the same.

At what level does the argument, “We just need more and better measurements of neurons and then we will understand consciousness,” start to sound suspiciously like voodoo economics?

And once again, I’m not discouraging the materialist approach. But I’m far from convinced by it, and I think it’s proponents should make sure their claims don’t put the cart ahead of the horse.

Appreciate the reply. I'd love to address some of the points I disagree with but my workload is going to be too intense today, and perhaps this weekend.

Maybe I'll have some time to write an obtuse reply Sunday.

 

[meauneau]

So different types of “truth” clearly exist.

As Kant pointed out a long time ago, there are a priori truths, a posteriori truths, and synthetic truths. If you are not familiar with those terms, I suggest you start there.

Kant said that no one would improve on Aristotle's syllogistic logic, he thought that was the limit of formal logic. He was wrong also about the synthetic a priori truths.

To correct you, there are three distinctions when it comes to truth, they are: necessary/contingent (metaphysics), analytic/synthetic (semantics) and a priori/a posteriori (epistemology).

Just saying.

 

[luckyshot]

Kant said that no one would improve on Aristotle's syllogistic logic, he thought that was the limit of formal logic. He was wrong also about the synthetic a priori truths.

To correct you, there are three distinctions when it comes to truth, they are: necessary/contingent (metaphysics), analytic/synthetic (semantics) and a priori/a posteriori (epistemology).

Just saying.

Thanks for the input.

I like that schema of metaphysics, semantics and epistemology (although I think there is considerably more to epistemology than just the distinction between a priori and a posteriori).

Kant is difficult. Even experts sometimes disagree (and I am far from an expert).

My interpretation of a “synthetic truth” is one that requires the combined application of logic (a priori knowledge) and empirical data (a posteriori knowledge). Is that an unorthodox interpretation?

Is so, do you see anything inherently problematic with it?

 

[meauneau]

Thanks for the input.

I like that schema of metaphysics, semantics and epistemology (although I think there is considerably more to epistemology than just the distinction between a priori and a posteriori).

Kant is difficult. Even experts sometimes disagree (and I am far from an expert).

My interpretation of a “synthetic truth” is one that requires the combined application of logic (a priori knowledge) and empirical data (a posteriori knowledge). Is that an unorthodox interpretation?

Is so, do you see anything inherently problematic with it?

A priori/posteriori truths is a distinction of how we know that a proposition is true, we can know it a priori or a posteriori, we can now it before or after experience. This is different from analytic/synthetic truths which depend on the meaning of the words in the proposition. If I know that a is bigger than b, and b bigger than c, then I know a priori that the proposition "a is bigger than c" is true; I don't kneed experience to know this, nor does the truth of the proposition depend on the meanings of "a" and "c".

An analytic truth is true by definition (semantics). A synthetic truth is true not by definition alone but by the meaning synthesised with facts. Hume called distinguished between relations of ideas (analytic truths) and matters of fact (synthetic truths).

Your interpretation is somewhat unconventional. You are right about the facts part but I think it is wrong that the other part is a priori knowledge. What we need for synthetic knowledge is meaning and fact, but logic underlies everything.

 

[luckyshot]

A priori/posteriori truths is a distinction of how we know that a proposition is true, we can know it a priori or a posteriori, we can now it before or after experience. This is different from analytic/synthetic truths which depend on the meaning of the words in the proposition. If I know that a is bigger than b, and b bigger than c, then I know a priori that the proposition "a is bigger than c" is true; I don't kneed experience to know this, nor does the truth of the proposition depend on the meanings of "a" and "c".

An analytic truth is true by definition (semantics). A synthetic truth is true not by definition alone but by the meaning synthesised with facts. Hume called distinguished between relations of ideas (analytic truths) and matters of fact (synthetic truths).

Your interpretation is somewhat unconventional. You are right about the facts part but I think it is wrong that the other part is a priori knowledge. What we need for synthetic knowledge is meaning and fact, but logic underlies everything.

You say “logic underlies everything.” I don’t think that is true. Sense data, for example, is not “logical.” It is raw experience.

Also, there is no “logic” either (that I am aware of) which explains why “law x” of physics should apply and not “law y” to this universe.

Now, you might argue that logic underlies all KNOWLEDGE because we store and organize (and probably filter) “knowledge of” empirical experience according to logical categories, but this still doesn’t suggest that empirical experiences ARE strictly logical. If they were, there would be no difference between “knowledge of” an experience and the experience itself.

We abstract logical interpretations from experiences (or in combination with them) and then create semantic terms to describe those abstractions.

 

[meauneau]

You say “logic underlies everything.” I don’t think that is true. Sense data, for example, is not “logical.” It is raw experience.

Also, there is no “logic” either (that I am aware of) which explains why “law x” of physics should apply and not “law y” to this universe.

Now, you might argue that logic underlies all KNOWLEDGE because we store and organize (and probably filter) “knowledge of” empirical experience according to logical categories, but this still doesn’t suggest that empirical experiences ARE strictly logical. If they were, there would be no difference between “knowledge of” an experience and the experience itself.

We abstract logical interpretations from experiences (or in combination with them) and then create semantic terms to describe those abstractions.

I didn't mean it as an absolute that logic underlies everything. I was referring to propositions (and arguments), they have logical structures. I don't believe in sense data and other abstract entities. And no logic doesn't apply to observation or protocol statements. But we can use logic to make inferences from observation statements to derive true conclusions from them.

The problem of underdeterminism in science is a problematic one (if law x and law y both fit the data but are logically different how do we determine which is the right one?), but it doesn't stop science from advancing. This is not a matter of logic though. Logic doesn't explain things as you say. You have to understand that logic is what we call the rules of reason or thought; we use these laws to make inferences that result in truth. Science doesn't operate in this way because science doesn't discover truths. If P then Q, Q therefore P is logically invalid but it is the logical structure of science. Science uses inductive logic which is not truth preserving unlike deductive logic which preserves truth through propositions by rules of inference.

 

[ShadBo]

I said I'd find some time to reply to you and, even though I'm still drowning in work, I need a little break so now is as good a time as any.

Ok. I’ll take another stab at this... if you give a obtuse reply, I’m done.

Is a statement like, “That water is too hot, be careful!” clear and intelligible? Does it communicate knowledge?

Of course it is, and of course it does. It communicates the sort of practical consideration that was probably the impetus for the development of language in the first place.

But is it an abstract concept or a physical one?

Actually, it is both.

The WATER is not, technically speaking “too hot” or even “hot.” It is the subjective experience of an OBSERVER that the water is hot.

I will grant you all of this because none of it is in conflict with my position.

When I'm talking about evidence, specifically in the context of science, I'm talking about being able to demonstrate and repeat phenomena that can be measured with reliable accuracy. Based upon these demonstrations and measurements we can assemble a body of facts that allow us to better understand and interact with nature. It would be simple to devise a study to determine at what point water is too hot for the average person. Water exists nearly everywhere. We have several different tools for measuring temperature. Experiences with water at various temperatures can be recorded and aggregated so there is no need to rely on an individual's subjective experience.

This type of study does not yet appear to be possible for the immaterial, metaphysical, or the spiritual. We do not possess the ability to conduct a study as simple as measuring the temperature of water for the metaphysical/immaterial/spiritual/etc. Literally all we have are the subjective experiences that people report, and unfalsifiable claims/hypotheses.

A couple of things:

1. Agree that the conversation and research should continue. And, barring some sort of dark age, of course it will.

2. I have no problem with Harris taking a neuroscience approach. I have a problem with him presenting this approach as if it is philosophy.

3. In a larger sense I have a problem with the popularizers of “new sciences” who have, in my opinion, sought to prematurely call the fight between neuroscience and philosophy, in particular, and the humanities, in general.

They have declared, or at least strongly implied, that the neuroscientific approach will, in time, render all philosophical questions moot and “demystify” such concepts and free will and consciousness...

And all this despite not having produced one iota of evidence regarding how conscious experience is produced strictly from matter (the materialist foundational assumption) much less being able to replicate the same.

At what level does the argument, “We just need more and better measurements of neurons and then we will understand consciousness,” start to sound suspiciously like voodoo economics?

And once again, I’m not discouraging the materialist approach. But I’m far from convinced by it, and I think it’s proponents should make sure their claims don’t put the cart ahead of the horse.

Consciousness relies entirely on a brain. There is no detectable consciousness that exists without a brain. The brain is entirely physical. That alone is a strong enough argument for the material foundation for consciousness for me.

At what point do we give up on methodological study of the only thing we seemingly have access to, the material world, and what would we replace it with?

 

[luckyshot]

I said I'd find some time to reply to you and, even though I'm still drowning in work, I need a little break so now is as good a time as any.



I will grant you all of this because none of it is in conflict with my position.

When I'm talking about evidence, specifically in the context of science, I'm talking about being able to demonstrate and repeat phenomena that can be measured with reliable accuracy. Based upon these demonstrations and measurements we can assemble a body of facts that allow us to better understand and interact with nature. It would be simple to devise a study to determine at what point water is too hot for the average person. Water exists nearly everywhere. We have several different tools for measuring temperature. Experiences with water at various temperatures can be recorded and aggregated so there is no need to rely on an individual's subjective experience.

This type of study does not yet appear to be possible for the immaterial, metaphysical, or the spiritual. We do not possess the ability to conduct a study as simple as measuring the temperature of water for the metaphysical/immaterial/spiritual/etc. Literally all we have are the subjective experiences that people report, and unfalsifiable claims/hypotheses.




Consciousness relies entirely on a brain. There is no detectable consciousness that exists without a brain. The brain is entirely physical. That alone is a strong enough argument for the material foundation for consciousness for me.

At what point do we give up on methodological study of the only thing we seemingly have access to, the material world, and what would we replace it with?

While it is true that we cannot detect or measure any subjective experience according to the scientific method, it is equally true that subjective experience exists. Not exactly a winning argument for the exclusivity of the scientific process. In fact, without a subjective experience of a consciousness, namely your own, you would have no knowledge of the scientific method.

So, the very method of science is a working of a subjective process (consciousness) that is itself not measurable or knowable through the method of science.

 

[ShadBo]

While it is true that we cannot detect or measure any subjective experience according to the scientific method, it is equally true that subjective experience exists. Not exactly a winning argument for the exclusivity of the scientific process. In fact, without a subjective experience of a consciousness, namely your own, you would have no knowledge of the scientific method.

So, the very method of science is a working of a subjective process (consciousness) that is itself not measurable or knowable through the method of science.

Consciousness is not measurable or knowable through the method of science?

Bold claim.

One that I think is demonstrably untrue.

Ninja edit:

There's a reason the logical absolutes are the foundation for reason. Although they are assumed, they continue to demonstrate their effectiveness.

It's true each person has their own subjective experience, however, I think we all share enough of the same experience that we can start identifying facts that relate to the reality we all appear to inhabit.

 

[Fawlty]

“Oh. So how do I know if I am going to order 4 or 6?”

“Well, you just have to wait and see.”

This may actually be the whole thing. This moment could not have been preceded by any other series of moments, so determinism is true in the past. We can prove that on a timeline, determinism can only be verified up to the present, and can make no verifiable claim on the future (we can only call the coin flip half the time). Further, we do not have temporal access to the point at which anything could have said to have become determined.

It's all a trick imo. What I think is really happening is that smart people are exploiting the fact that we live in one universe with one set of events, and using that to play mind games with each other and their students. It's correct at any time to say that we have always lived in a deterministic universe. It is also of absolutely no consequence and can safely be dismissed as absurd.

I think ultimately we'll find that the conscious mind acts as an editor for subconscious decision-making-algorithms. I don't think that qualifies as free will, but it explains how we can make choices.

 

[Satsui Ryu]

Considering what has been learned about psychology and neuroscience it is kind of hard to believe in free will. One example people can look at as SSRI's. Simply changing the amount of serotonin in one's brain can have a huge impact on the decisions that person makes. People's decisions are a culmination of their wants, temperaments, fears, intelligence, risk aversion, empathy, etc. There are certainly external factors such as environment especially when a person is young, but even in that case there isn't much control over that.

 

[eworden78]

I've been thinking about this and struggling with the implications here's how I've been looking at it.(These aren't established philosophical names, I just made them up)

• Level 1A: Strict material determinism. All events are linked with a clear physical causality to prior events. IE with sufficient knowledge all outcomes are predictable.
• Level 1B: Loose material determinism. All events follow a form of causality but the causality may be uncertain. This could be related to quantum uncertainty, Many Worlds Interpretation, chaos theory, etc. This differs from 1A in that outcomes many be impossible to predict regardless of how much knowledge you have of the causal factors.
• Level 2: Consciousness/Mind duality determinism. "We" as in our our manifestation of consciousness is a passive observer and not the locus of any decision making. Any spontaneity our brain may be capable of, is independent of our consciousness, and therefore not "our" decision.
  
• Level 3A: Strict neurological determinism. Our brains are simply organic computers that output certain actions based on data and algorithms derived from biological and environmental inputs.
• Level 3B: Loose neurological determinism. Our brains can make non-predetermined decisions, however the framework of those decisions is predetermined by biology and environment. An example of this would be the shooter that had a brain tumor, and thus was not responsible for his actions.

The levels are roughly ordered from least practical to most practical. Level 1A has no realistic bearing on any societal or personal motivations. But Level 3B is critical for considering crime, punishment, , personal motivation, relationships, and mental pathology.

Where I have issues with Harris, is that he seems to jump around between these different levels indiscriminately, and I'm not sure where one starts and one ends in much of his material and talks. To me it seems that any lower level would subsume all the levels above it, rendering the upper levels consideration meaningless. If everything is deterministic on a materialistic level, and all things are material. Why would it matter whether our brains have the appearance of free will on a neurological level?

 

[meauneau]

This may actually be the whole thing. This moment could not have been preceded by any other series of moments, so determinism is true in the past. We can prove that on a timeline, determinism can only be verified up to the present, and can make no verifiable claim on the future (we can only call the coin flip half the time). Further, we do not have temporal access to the point at which anything could have said to have become determined.

It's all a trick imo. What I think is really happening is that smart people are exploiting the fact that we live in one universe with one set of events, and using that to play mind games with each other and their students. It's correct at any time to say that we have always lived in a deterministic universe. It is also of absolutely no consequence and can safely be dismissed as absurd.

I think ultimately we'll find that the conscious mind acts as an editor for subconscious decision-making-algorithms. I don't think that qualifies as free will, but it explains how we can make choices.

That would be compatibilism.

 

[21 Savage]

i cant be mad at the dumb dumbs who still believe in free will because they didnt choose to believe in it woah